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Abstract 
Products and services often provide value that goes beyond functional utility. Drawing from 
a compensatory consumption model, which suggests that consumption is a means to regulate 
self-discrepancies, the current research suggests that consumers are motivated to self-regulate 
their emotions and this self-regulation can be accomplished via consumption. Specifically, 
emotional and physiological deviations from a steady state motivate individuals to find 
balance in order to alleviate those deviations. Three papers provide evidence for this 
hypothesis. Utilizing an embodied cognition framework for chapter 2 and chapter 3, I 
demonstrate that individuals are motivated to reduce a perceived lack of interpersonal 
warmth by substituting physical warmth, and vice versa (chapter 2). Next, I argue that 
experiencing action regret results in self-conscious emotions (e.g. shame, guilt) associated 
with physical warmth, which in turn motivates individuals to ameliorate those emotional 
states via interaction with objects that are perceived to be physically or psychologically 
opposite in temperature (chapter 3). Finally, in chapter 4, I argue that individuals regulate 
feelings of sadness by seeking affiliation with others.   
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 Introduction 
Individuals consistently face situations whereby they perceive a self-discrepancy between 
their current state and some goal state (Higgins 1987; Carver & Scheier 2001). These 
self-discrepancies subsequently motivate individuals to engage in behaviors to achieve or 
restore this desired state. In many cases, this behavior often takes the form of 
consumption. For example, a consumer may see a luxury car advertisement that triggers a 
discrepancy between their current status and their desired one, or that consumer may seek 
out attachment to an object or brand as a result of threatened attachment security (Keefer, 
Landau, Rothschild & Sullivan 2014).  
A considerable amount of literature has provided evidence in a variety of domains that 
consumers engage in compensatory consumption - utilizing products or services to reduce 
or restore a self-discrepancy (Mandel et al., 2017; Gronmo 1988). Products, brands, and 
experiences often serve to create, maintain, signal, and preserve our identity and self-
concepts (Belk, 1988) and as such, consumption can assist in resolving these self-
discrepancies. These compensatory processes can be relatively direct, such as when a 
consumer is unsatisfied with their appearance and joins a gym, or more symbolic, such as 
a greater desire for conspicuous luxury items when feeling powerless (Rucker & 
Galinsky 2009). In a recent review, Mandel and colleagues (2017) cited a sample of 
relevant papers that demonstrated compensatory behaviors when consumers faced self-
discrepancies with intelligence, physical appearance, academic ability, power, and dozens 
more. Of interest to the current dissertation, emotional discrepancies were absent from 
this list. 
Although emotions are often examined in conjunction with compensatory processes, the 
focus is primarily on examining emotions as either the antecedent or consequence. 
Indeed, self-discrepancies often produce aversive states such as anxiety, shame, or 
disappointment, which provides the antecedent for the motivation to resolve the 
discrepancy, resulting in positive affect. However, virtually all extant research is focused 
on specific psychological cognitions often relating to one’s self-concept, such as physical 
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appearance (Park and Maner, 2009), intelligence (Kim & Gal, 2014), uncertainty (Gao et 
al., 2009), power (Rucker and Galinsky 2008, 2009) or masculinity (Willer et al., 2002). 
However, little research has focused on emotional discrepancies. The current research 
focuses and explores this gap. 
 Compensatory Consumption and Emotion Regulation 
Although the function, purpose, and desirability of emotions has been debated throughout 
history, they have consistently been thought to exert a powerful influence on judgments 
and behavior. Indeed, emotions have a strong influence on attention, perception, memory, 
goal regulation, and consumption (Ohman, Flykt & Esteves 2001; Nygaard & Lunders 
2002). Related research has focused on emotion regulation, defined as “the process by 
which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how 
they experience and express these emotions" (Gross, 1998 p.275). The work on emotion 
regulation has focused primarily on specific regulatory strategies, which consist of 
situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment (distraction and 
concentration), reappraisal, suppression, and distraction (Bonnano & Burton, 2013; Gross 
& Thompson 2007; for a review see Webb, Miles, & Sheeran 2012). In each of these 
strategies, individuals cognitively assess their emotional state and attempt to consciously 
initiate, modify, or maintain it. Under this view, individuals attempt to regulate their 
emotions in service of some goal. 
However, emotional regulation need not be means to an end. Other models of emotion 
regulation do not imply these same mechanisms. Carver and Scheier’s (1989, 1990, 
2001) model of emotional self-regulation suggests an implicit set of feedback loops to 
restore a sensed emotional discrepancy. Similar to the processes and elements that 
underlie homeostasis, emotion regulation functions as a form of goal pursuit in which 
actions are taken to reduce discrepancies from some ideal state. Consistent with this 
view, I suggest that consumers may seek specific types of consumption in an attempt to 
achieve a desired emotional state. The current research argues that individuals can also 
regulate their emotions via compensatory consumption.  
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Although consumer behavior research has focused on the various coping strategies 
consumers use to manage negative emotions, such as stress and anxiety (e.g. Duhachek, 
2005; Duhackek & Iacobucci 2005), other research has demonstrated that consumers 
engage in compensatory consumption related to emotion regulation (Di Muro & Murray 
2012; Labroo & Mukhopadyay, 2009; Shen & Wyer 2008). For example, Labroo and 
Mukhopadyay (2009) demonstrated that consumers will choose an indulgent snack if 
they believe that their negative affect is lasting or if they believe that their positive affect 
is fleeting. Similarly, consumers will choose a relaxing low arousal drink (e.g. iced tea) in 
order to regulate a negatively-valenced high arousal state, but will choose a high arousal 
drink (e.g. an energy drink) in order to regulate a negatively-valenced low arousal state 
(Di Muro & Murray 2012).  
While evidence exists demonstrating that consumers use consumption in order to regulate 
general affective states, the current dissertation builds on this literature by focusing on 
specific emotional states. While previous research suggests that consumers often seek 
consumption to assist with mood maintenance, current theorizing in this area lacks 
predictive nuance. For example, there are a number of positively and negatively valenced 
emotions (e.g. relaxed versus excited, anger versus sadness), and the products and 
services consumers seek in these experiences may differ considerably. Indeed, Lerner & 
Keltner (2000) demonstrate that two emotions, fear and anger, while having similar 
valence, result in vastly different risk perceptions, with fearful people being pessimistic 
and angry people being optimistic. 
Second, although positive affect is typically the goal, consumers may seek and maintain 
negatively emotional states, such as anger or anxiety, when expecting a confrontation or 
preparing for a test (Tamir 2005, Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross 2008). Further, certain 
emotional states motivate different types of behavior: for example, experiencing fear 
motivates a desire for greater social connection, but experiencing other types of negative 
emotions, such as anger, or disgust (Dunn & Hoegg, 2014) does not. Similarly, 
experiencing sadness leads to greater high risk/high reward options, while anxiety leads 
to low risk/low reward options (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).    
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The position advanced in chapter 2 and chapter 3 draws on an embodied view of 
emotions and argues that emotion and subsequent emotion regulation is grounded in 
bodily states. Research has shown that psychological embodied manipulations can affect 
physiological experiences and vice versa. For example, being socially excluded results in 
lower skin temperatures, but holding a warm cup alleviates this effect (IJzerman et al. 
2012). This is supported by neuroimaging studies that suggest that emotional pain (i.e., 
social exclusion) activates areas in the brain that motivates individuals to reduce and 
regulate such pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams 2003). This motivation to 
reduce psychological pain similar to reducing physical pain suggests that embodied 
processes should respond in a similar way. That is, individuals can use physical objects to 
self-regulate psychological deviations, or could respond to a physical imbalance by 
behaving in ways that result in a psychological response that alleviates that imbalance. 
Physical objects used to self-regulate such imbalances should be related to some attribute 
of the source of the deviation. In many instances, this manifests itself as desire or 
preference for that physical object (Aarts, Custers, and Holland 2007; Forster, Liberman, 
and Friedman 2007; Higgins 1987). Hence, as an emotional discrepancy increases, so 
does one’s desire for a psychologically related physical object. I elaborate on these ideas 
in the following section. 
 Embodied Cognition 
“Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are 
frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis 
here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental 
state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first 
be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry 
because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we 
cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful as the case may be." 
(James, 1884 p. 13). 
Over the past two decades, the traditional view of human behavior as the product of the 
brain as an abstract processor has been challenged by research linking behavior to one’s 
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physical body. Rather than seeing cognition as an amodal set of processes, recent 
findings have suggested instead that higher level processes are grounded in perceptual, 
motor, and sensory experiences (Niedenthal 2007). This view, known as embodied 
cognition (or grounded cognition), suggests that the processing of information is 
influenced by one’s bodily states.  
Much of the early research in this area focused on how the body informs how we process 
emotions. For example, smiling is associated with happiness and laughter (Strack, 
Martin, & Strepper 1988), anger with muscle tension and increased blood pressure 
(Niedenthal 2007), and loneliness with cold (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). However, 
extant research in embodiment theory within social psychology and marketing has 
typically been descriptive, rather than explanatory (Meier et al. 2012), and no major 
theory has emerged to describe the mechanisms and boundary conditions underlying 
these effects (Niedenthal et al. 2005; Smith and Semin 2004; Winkielman, Niedenthal, 
Wilgosz, & Kavangh 2015). 
Some have argued that embodied manipulations activate concepts in memory, thus 
increasing the accessibility of related concepts. For example, holding a warm cup of 
coffee influences individuals to rate others as having a ‘warmer’ personality (Williams 
and Bargh 2008, but see Lynott et al., 2014), while inducing suspicion results in greater 
accessibility of fish-related words and consequently increasing the detection of fishy 
smells (Lee and Schwarz 2012). However, other extant research is not as easily 
interpretable within the accessibility framework. Lee and Schwarz (2010) have noted that 
the act of physically cleansing oneself (Lee and Schwarz 2010; Zhong and Liljenquist 
2006) decreases one’s guilt, but priming cleanliness has no effect. How might one 
interpret results like those reported by Lee and Schwarz (2010)? I suggest that these 
findings are better understood using a self-regulatory explanation. Although the term self-
regulation has come to refer to self-control for many social psychology and marketing 
researchers (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice 1993), in the current research self-
regulation is defined as the corrective behavior that achieves physical or psychological 
balance (see Lee, Rotman, and Perkins 2014).  
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As Damasio and Carvalho (2013) note, survival is dependent on maintaining bodily states 
within an optimal homeostatic range. Certain states such as hunger or fear are caused by 
automatic physiological reactions and subsequent motivational states are instrumental in 
resolving this emotional discrepancy. However, despite the considerable amount of work 
within biology and neurophysiology that has elucidated both the importance and 
mechanisms of homeostasis, this work has been relatively silent in explaining mental 
states (Damasio 2001). To fill this gap, the current dissertation argues that individuals 
have an emotional set-point and deviations from this set-point result in a motivation to 
resolve this discrepancy and restore equilibrium. Because emotions are grounded in 
physiological states, then consistent with physiological discrepancies similar homeostatic 
mechanisms should equally apply. For example, when individuals feel cold, they will 
seek out social warmth (e.g. chapter 2) or when experiencing shame and regret, will seek 
ways to mitigate these feelings (e.g. chapter 3). 
 Overview of Papers 
Through three papers I examine the idea that consumption can serve a compensatory role 
in emotion regulation:  
In chapter 2, Embodied Cognition and Social Consumption: Self-Regulating Temperature 
through Social Products and Behaviors, I demonstrate that individuals can reduce a 
perceived lack of interpersonal warmth by substituting physical warmth, and vice versa. I 
suggest that this behavior is self-regulatory in nature and that this self-regulation can be 
accomplished via consumptive behavior.  
In chapter 3, The Warmth of our Regrets: Managing Regret Through Physiological 
Regulation Via Consumptive Behavior, I suggest that experiencing action regret results in 
self-conscious emotions (e.g. shame, guilt, etc.) which are associated with physical 
warmth. This in turn, motivates individuals to ameliorate that change via interaction with 
objects that are perceived to be physically or psychologically opposite in temperature. 
Lastly, in chapter 4: The Utility of Sadness: Exploring the Consequences of Sad 
Consumption, I argue that the enjoyment of sadness is the result of a regulatory 
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mechanism in which sadness, but not other negative emotions, motivates individuals to 
seek social connectedness and affiliation. This motivation to connect with others leads to 
the enjoyment of sad media and a greater sense of subjective well-being.  
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2 Chapter 2: 
Embodied Cognition and Social Consumption: Self-regulating 
temperature through social products and behaviors 
 
 Abstract 
Extant embodied cognition research suggests that individuals can reduce a perceived lack 
of interpersonal warmth by substituting physical warmth, and vice versa. We suggest that 
this behavior is self-regulatory in nature and that this self-regulation can be accomplished 
via consumptive behavior. Experiment 1 found that consumers perceived ambient 
temperature to be significantly lower when eating alone compared to eating with a 
partner. Experiment 2 found that consuming a cool (vs. warm) drink led individuals to 
generate more socially-oriented attributes for a hypothetical product. Experiment 3 found 
that physically cooler individuals desired a social consumption setting, whereas 
physically warmer individuals desired a lone consumption setting. We interpret these 
results within the context of self-regulation, such that perceived physical temperature 
deviations from a steady state unconsciously motivate the individual to find bodily 
balance in order to alleviate that deviation.  
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 Introduction 
A recent surge of psychology research examines an essential link between physiological 
experiences and social perceptions, behavior, and judgments (Williams & Bargh, 2008; 
Bargh & Shalev, 2012; Fay & Maner, 2012; Steinmetz & Mussweiler, 2011; Zhong & 
Leonardelli, 2008; Hong & Sun, 2012). These results are consistent with the emerging 
field of embodied cognition, which argues that our metaphorical understanding of 
concepts are grounded in, and can be influenced by, the physical experiences of our 
environment (Wilson, 2002; Barsalou, 1999; Niedenthal et al., 2005; Williams, Huang, & 
Bargh, 2009). Much of the extant embodied cognition literature in this domain focuses on 
the link between physical warmth or coldness and its relation to social relationships. For 
instance, physical warmth positively influences social perceptions, social trust, and social 
proximity (Ijzerman & Semin, 2009; Williams & Bargh, 2008), while feeling lonely (i.e., 
social exclusion) relates to perceptions of physical coldness or desire for warm remedies 
(Ijzerman & Semin, 2010; Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). That is, experiencing physical 
warmth relates to interpersonal affection whereas experiencing physical coldness relates 
to exclusion and self-centeredness (Williams & Bargh, 2008). In addition, this link is 
bidirectional in nature (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008), in that physiological experiences 
affect social affiliation as much as social experiences affect physiological reactions. 
This bidirectional link between social affiliation and physiological warmth has been 
argued from a variety of perspectives. One of the prevailing views is the conceptual 
metaphorical perspective (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Gibbs, 1994; Barsalou, 2008), 
which argues that individuals jointly experience both abstract and physical concepts and 
subsequently conflate the two. Coupled with findings from embodied cognition, when 
individuals experience physical warmth, they feel closer to others, whereas when 
individuals feel cold, they feel psychologically more distant. Indeed, we often refer to 
“warm” individuals as trusting and generous, whereas “cold” individuals are competitive 
and untrustworthy (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Williams & Bargh, 2008). Statements 
such as “I’m giving you the icy stare” or “we are on thin ice” carry a negative omen of 
hatred or breakage of friendship in an interpersonal context while “she is warm and 
friendly” or “our relationship is heating up” represents a positive tone of attractiveness 
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and affection in the same context. Further, studies show differences in bodily temperature 
based on people’s personalities and their social environment. When participants are with 
similar others, they experience the ambient temperature to be higher (Ijzerman & Semin, 
2010), while social exclusion leads individuals to feel colder (Ijzerman et al. 2012; Zhong 
& Leonardelli, 2008). This explains why people may feel greater “warmth” around their 
loved ones (e.g., families and friends) and “coldness” around those they dislike.   
Moreover, the link between physical and social warmth is supported by research in 
biology and neuroscience. Social neuroscience research shows greater activation within 
the participants’ left anterior insula during a social trust exercise after touching a cold 
pack, identifying the insula as a neural substrate that mediates the link between 
temperature and social trust (Kang et al., 2011). In another study, hand skin temperature 
decreased after participants were confronted with personally threatening questions 
(Rimm-Kaufman & Kagan, 1996). That is, when potential for interpersonal relations are 
compromised, people experience a drop in body temperature. Taken together, the 
linguistic coupling of metaphors reflect people’s predisposition to experience a 
physiological change in social situations (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). This view 
ultimately suggests that language and our higher order cognitions are grounded in human 
behavior and physical contexts (Glenberg, 1997; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002).  
 Embodied Cognition and Self-Regulation 
Work exploring embodiment and conceptual metaphor theory within social psychology 
and marketing has typically been descriptive, rather than explanatory (Meier et al., 2012). 
Certainly, literature has focused on exploring the interesting effects related to embodied 
psychology, but has yet to truly understand the mechanisms, boundary conditions, or 
mediators underlying them. Despite all the evidence exploring embodied cognition, no 
major theory has yet emerged to explain it (Smith & Semin, 2004; Neidenthal et al., 
2005).  
Some views in embodied psychology have argued that embodied manipulations activate 
concepts and increase the accessibility of related ideas. For instance, holding a warm cup 
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of coffee influences individuals to rate others as having a ‘warmer’ personality (Williams 
& Bargh, 2008). Furthermore, inducing suspicion results in greater accessibility of fish-
related words and detection of fishy smells (Lee & Schwarz, 2012). However, other 
research is not easily understood with such an explanation. Indeed, Lee and Schwarz 
(2012) have noted that physically cleansing oneself (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Lee & 
Schwarz, 2010a) decreases one’s guilt but being primed has no effect. Rather, that 
research appears to be better understood through a self-regulatory explanation.  
Although the term self-regulation has come to refer to self-control for many social 
psychology and marketing researchers (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994), we use 
self-regulation to refer to corrective behavior that achieves physical or psychological 
balance. One example of a self-regulatory embodied process comes from Kouchaki and 
colleagues (2013) who showed that not only did wearing a heavy backpack intensify 
feelings of guilt (e.g., heavy burden to bear), but individuals were more likely to choose a 
healthy snack and less likely to cheat, ostensibly to self-regulate those feelings of guilt. 
Demonstrating the bi-directionality of this effect, individuals can regulate emotions such 
as guilt or dissonance through embodied metaphorical actions such as washing one’s 
hands (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Lee & Schwarz, 
2010b) and show a greater desire for products that allow them to do so (Lee & Schwarz, 
2010a).  
Other researchers argue that physical states can affect psychological processes such as 
perception, in order to regulate one’s behavior towards optimal outcomes (Balcetis & 
Dunning, 2009; Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). For example, Proffitt and colleagues (Bhalla & 
Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al., 2003) demonstrate that when individuals are fatigued they 
will see hills as steeper and distances as farther, whereas Balcetis and Dunning (2009) 
showed that objects such as a water bottle are perceived as closer when they are more 
desirable (e.g., when people are thirstier). More related to the current research, work with 
temperature demonstrates that individuals who are induced to feel lonely seek to regulate 
these feelings of exclusion with a greater desire for warm drinks and food (Zhong & 
Leonardelli, 2008) or through behavior such as warm showers and baths (Bargh & 
Shalev, 2012). 
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Furthermore, research has demonstrated that psychological embodied manipulations can 
affect physiological experiences and vice versa. For example, being socially excluded 
results in lower skin temperatures but holding a warm cup can alleviate this effect 
(Ijzerman et al., 2012). Thus, if we have an innate tendency to maintain balance with 
respect to physiological changes such as temperature, then metaphorical embodied 
manipulation of temperatures should result in the same processes. Specifically, 
individuals can use physical objects to self-regulate psychological deviations from a state 
of balance. Conversely, an individual might respond to a physical imbalance by 
unconsciously behaving in ways that result in a psychological response consistent with 
alleviating that imbalance. Physical objects used to self-regulate a psychological 
imbalance should be related to some attribute of the source of the deviation. In many 
instances, this manifests itself as desire for that physical object (Aarts, Custer, & 
Holland, 2007; Forster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007; Higgins, 1987). Hence, as 
psychological discrepancy increases, so does the desire for a related object. 
While some of these results are interpretable within a consumption context (e.g., 
mouthwash, water bottle), no research in this domain specifically investigates 
consumption behaviors (context or product attributes) as a solution for this self-
regulatory imbalance. Thus, the current research expands our understanding of the self-
regulatory power of consumer goods (i.e., social products). Within the consumer domain, 
we argue that interpersonal warmth can be represented by type of consumption 
experiences or product attributes. Specifically, consumption experiences or product 
attributes that are social in nature might serve as a tool to substitute for interpersonal 
warmth. Previous research (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Belk, 
1988; Rucker & Galinksy, 2008; Fournier, 1998; Solomon, 1983) suggests consumer 
products attain social and interpersonal attributes. Recent research argues people use 
social products (i.e., interactive products) to fulfill their need for affiliation and belonging 
(Ridings & Gefen, 2004). Thus, we extend these findings by examining the relationship 
between metaphorical and physical warmth and social belonging in a variety of 
consumption contexts.  
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Three experiments examine the relationship between physical temperature, social 
interaction, and consumption experiences. Specifically, we demonstrate that certain 
consumptive behaviors (consumptive experiences and products whose attributes are 
interpersonal in nature) serve as a self-regulatory mechanism. In experiment 1, we 
observe a social consumption setting and link these to perceptions of ambient 
temperature. In experiment 2, we manipulate the temperature of a consumed drink prior 
to assessing the desirability of interpersonal (i.e., facilitative of social interaction) product 
attributes. Experiment 3 manipulates ambient temperature and measures the desirability 
for a two-person versus a single-person consumption experience. Taken together, these 
results suggest that the relationship between metaphorical and physical temperature 
manifests itself within the context of consumptive behaviors and product attributes, and 
that, more importantly, both physical and metaphorical warmth act as a self-regulatory 
mechanism via those consumptive behaviors and product attributes. 
 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 (field study) observes whether a relationship exists between social 
consumption setting and perception of atmospheric temperature. Specifically, we believe 
individuals in a low social consumption setting (e.g., eating a meal alone) should perceive 
the surrounding temperature as lower than the actual ambient temperature. On the other 
hand, individuals in a high social consumption setting (e.g., eating a meal with another 
person) should perceive the surrounding temperature as higher than the actual ambient 
temperature.  
Method 
Experiment 1 was conducted at a food court during lunch time (12-3pm) in a large public 
shopping mall (over 190 stores). 56 restaurant customers participated voluntarily in this 
field study. The experimenters approached 28 individuals dining by themselves (low 
social consumption condition) and 28 individuals dining with one other person (high 
social consumption condition) and asked whether they would be willing to participate in 
a short study. After receiving their consent, the experimenter asked the subjects to 
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estimate the current building temperature (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). To give them a 
baseline, we informed participants that the normal room temperature is 22°C. The actual 
room temperature was not given to the participants but it was measured to be 21.5°C. To 
prevent hypothesis guessing, the participants were informed that this information was 
requested by the mall maintenance staff. After providing their answers, the individual 
was thanked for their time. 
Results 
Participants in Experiment 1 estimated a range of atmospheric temperatures from 11°C to 
27°C (M = 21.39°C, SD=2.92°C). The participant group as a whole was very accurate in 
their assessment of the ambient temperature: there was no difference between the group 
estimate of the ambient temperature and the actual (21.5°C: t(55) = -.28, p = .78) or the 
informed temperature (22.0°C: t(55) = -1.56, p = .13). However, participants sitting 
alone (low social consumption condition) gave lower estimates of room temperature than 
those who were eating with another person (high social consumption condition) (M low = 
20.21°C (SD=3.25) vs. M high= 22.57°C (SD=1.97); t(54) = 3.28, p < .01). Further, 
participants dining alone (low social consumption setting) provided estimates lower than 
the actual room temperature (at 21.5°C) (t(27)low = -2.10, p < .05), while people dining 
with another person gave higher estimates than the actual room temperature (t(27)high = 
2.87, p < .01). Thus, the results suggest a relationship between social consumption setting 
and perceived atmospheric temperature.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 converges with previous research that demonstrates social interactions are 
related with feelings of warmth. The results suggest that the social characteristics of a 
consumption setting affect perceptions of ambient temperature. Specifically, eating a 
meal alone (a low social consumption setting) led individuals to underestimate the actual 
ambient temperature of the room, while eating a meal with another individual (a high 
social consumption setting) led individuals to overestimate the actual ambient 
temperature in the room. Since pairs of individuals eating together in the food court are 
most likely know each other, the current research findings are analogous to Ijzerman and 
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Semin (2010) who reported that those surrounded by familiar others perceive ambient 
temperature to be warmer or that feeling socially excluded leads to lower estimates of 
temperature (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). Taken together, the results of this field study 
establish a link between social situation (or proximity) and perception of ambient 
temperature. 
In experiment 2, we test whether manipulating temperature alters people’s desire for 
social products. Drawing from our discussion of self-regulation, we predict that 
individuals who are warm are less interested in social products, whereas those who are 
cool are more likely to seek such interactions through their products. Physiological 
research has long known the threats of overheating and the importance of cooling 
(Sutton, 1909; Caruso et al., 1992) and there is reason to believe that individuals feel the 
need to find balance from feeling warm or cold. Here, we extend this notion to show that 
people seek to self-regulate their physical temperature through desire for social products. 
Hence, we predict people consuming a warm (cool) drink will experience less (more) 
desire for social products. 
 Experiment 2 
A total of 54 undergraduate students (54% females) participated in exchange for course 
credit. Upon arriving to the lab, we told them that they would be completing two mini-
studies. In part one, we asked students to evaluate a new type of tea. Students were 
randomly given a warm or cool tea. To give individuals the time to drink the tea, we 
asked the participants to write their thoughts and comments about the product (while 
drinking). This was also done to prevent any hypotheses guessing. In part two, we 
provided individuals with a description of a new robot-maid prototype that is being 
developed in Japan for the future. We showed them a picture of the product and told them 
that the inventor is seeking to add more functions to increase the capabilities of the robot 
prototype. We asked the participants to suggest as many ideas as they could for new 
functionalities and features that would be suitable and desired by the participant (should 
they purchase it). Participant responses were coded by two judges unaware of the 
research hypotheses. The judges were instructed to rate thoughts/ideas that relate to 
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interactive functions as social (e.g., talking/interacting, walking buddy, sexual acts) and 
rate thoughts/ideas that relate to non-interactive functions as non-social (e.g., vacuuming, 
cooking, alarm clock). Overall, the two coders’ results were very consistent (r = .98) and 
any outstanding disagreements were resolved through a discussion with the authors. As 
our dependent measure, a social thought index was constructed by taking the difference 
between the number of non-social thoughts and social thoughts, divided by the total 
number of thoughts. Zero indicates an equal number of two types of thoughts, a positive 
number indicates more social thoughts, and a negative number indicates more non-social 
thoughts. 
Results 
Participants, on average, came up with a total of 5.54 (SD=2.17) ideas. In general, 
participants came up with more non-social functions than social functions (M social = 
2.50 (SD=1.21) vs. M non-social= 3.07 (SD=1.47); t(52) =2.64, p < .05). This was 
expected as it is easier for participants to come up with non-social uses for a robot maid 
compared to interactive uses. Consistent with our predictions, the participants consuming 
a cool beverage scored higher on the social thought index than the participants 
consuming a warm beverage (M cool = .05 (SD=0.34) vs. M warm= -.21 (SD=0.37); 
t(52) = 2.71, p < .01). That is, people consuming a cool beverage (vs. warm) reported a 
higher ratio of social functions to non-social functions, ostensibly because they longed 
for more social yearning through their robot-maid. 
Discussion 
The results of experiment 2 provide evidence that social products serve as a proxy for 
social interactions to regulate temperature. Furthermore, the results of experiment 2 
support the idea that those individuals who are warm become less interested in social 
interactions, whereas those who are cool are more likely to seek such interactions.  
In the case of experiment 2, individuals were manipulated to feel warm/cool and then 
their desire for a social product was examined using a thought-listing task. Experiment 3 
builds on this by observing whether ambient temperature affects the actual desirability of 
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different types of consumption settings. Specifically, we manipulate two independent 
variables of interest: the ambient temperature of the experimental room (cool versus 
warm), and whether the social consumption setting (a movie theater package) was to be 
consumed alone (low social consumption setting) or was to be consumed with another 
individual (high social consumption setting). The dependent variable was the overall 
desirability of the social consumption setting. If temperature and the social consumption 
are inherently linked, we suspect that the environment (warm or cool room) moderates 
consumers’ level of desire for social consumption activities. We predict people in a warm 
(cool) room will experience less (more) desire for social consumption. 
 Experiment 3 
Ninety-four undergraduate students (50% females) participated in this experiment as part 
of a larger study. The study was a 2 (room temperature: warm / cool) x 2 (social 
consumption: low / high) between-subjects design. To manipulate room temperature, we 
modified the room temperature prior to students coming into the lab. We also asked the 
students to take off their jackets, thereby ensuring that temperature perceptions would not 
be attenuated by participants’ attire (Steinmetz & Mussweiler, 2011). Similar to the 
temperature ranges used in previous research (Ijzerman & Semin, 2009), the cool 
condition retained a room temperature of approximately 17-18 °C and the warm 
condition retained a room temperature of 26-27°C. To manipulate social consumption, 
we asked to them evaluate the attractiveness of a new Groupon movie-package deal. In 
the low social consumption condition, the participants saw a deal that included the price 
of admission, small popcorn and small drink, and reserved seating priced at $15 (limit of 
1 purchase per person). In the high social consumption condition, the participants saw a 
deal that included two admission tickets, two small popcorn and drinks, and reserved 
seating priced at $30 (limit of 1 purchase per person). We then asked the participants to 
evaluate the desirability of the deal (1- not desirable; 7 – very desirable). 
Results 
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ANOVA analysis revealed an interaction effect of temperature and social consumption 
F(1,93) = 12.33, p < .01, η2p = .10). Simple main effects revealed that people in the cool 
room evaluated the coupon-for-two deal (high social consumption) higher than the 
coupon-for-one deal (low social consumption) (M high = 6.09 (SD=0.95) vs. M low= 
5.29 (SD=1.16); F(1,93)= 6.24, p < .05, η2p = .04). In addition, simple main effects also 
revealed that people in the warm room evaluated the coupon-for-one deal higher than the 
coupon-for-two deal (M high = 5.08 (SD=1.38) vs. M low= 5.87 (SD=0.78); F(1,93)= 
6.09, p < .05, η2p = .04). See figure 1 for a graphical representation of the results. 
Overall, the results of experiment 3 provide additional evidence that consumptive 
behaviors can be used by individuals to self-regulate temperature in both warm and cool 
situations. Specifically, we found that individuals who felt cool desired a consumption 
experience that included others, whereas those who were warm desired a lone 
consumption experience.  
 General Discussion 
Past marketing studies related to temperature primarily focus on retailers’ “servicescape”, 
specifically on how temperature affects ambient experiences (Booms & Bitner, 1992; 
Hoffman & Turley, 2002). For example, retailers avoid setting very high or very low 
temperature to discourage avoidance behavior (Baker, 1987) and consumers perceive 
temperature in “on-the-ground” department stores as more stable than underground 
department stores (Chun & Tamura, 1998). While these studies reveal the important role 
of temperature in consumption experiences, researchers lack the understanding of how 
temperature relates to social consumption contexts (i.e., consuming alone vs. consuming 
with others) or with social products (e.g., interactive features such as Siri in iPhones). In 
three experiments, we provide support for the self-regulatory power of social 
consumption and products. In experiment 1, we first established the link between social 
consumption and temperature such that individuals sitting alone perceived the ambient 
temperature to be significantly lowered (cooler) than individuals who were sitting with 
another individual. This supports and confirms extant literature in the field of embodied 
cognition. Experiment 2 revealed that being cool (vs. warm) increased an individual’s  
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Figure 1: Temperature x Social Product on Movie Package Desirability  
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desire for social features in a hypothetical product. These findings parallel the notion that 
physical experiences such as temperature influence social information processing 
(Steinmetz & Mussweiler, 2011). However, it counters recent beliefs that warmth 
activates social affiliative motivations (Fay & Maner, 2012). Instead, people given a cool 
(vs. warm) drink prefer social affiliation to achieve bodily balance, potentially explaining 
why explains why people given a cool (vs. warm) drink generated more social-related 
thoughts for their robot-maid in experiment 2. While it is possible that people in cool 
(warm) states may feel isolated (connected) from others and make judgments that are 
socially cool (warm) (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005; Ijzerman & Semin, 2009), it 
doesn’t preclude them seeking or desiring warmth (coolness). Hence, it is still possible 
that individuals still feel closer to others when experiencing warmth, but develop a 
preference and desire for remedies that balance their physiological system. 
Experiment 3 suggests individuals attempt to self-regulate when they are exposed to 
either a warm or cool physical setting. When placed in a cool room, participants desired 
an entertainment package that was socially inclusive, while those placed in a warm room 
desired the entertainment package that was socially exclusive. While previous studies 
suggest that physical warmth may act as a substitute for people’s desire for affiliation or 
promote pro-social behavior (Bargh & Shalev, 2012; Ijzerman et al., 2012), our findings 
are more aligned with the notion that people desire remedies to counterbalance their 
current state (i.e., self-regulation). For example, physical coldness can cause a feeling of 
loneliness (Bargh & Shalev, 2012), which in turn creates desire for social remedies (i.e., 
coupon-for-two). Together, our findings confirm and are consistent with theories that 
social experiences are not independent of physiological experiences, and that they are 
very much relevant to consumption contexts. More importantly, we show temperature 
influences consumers’ desire for social consumption (E3) and social products (E2). 
It should be noted that the effects outlined here are opposite to what one would expect 
given a more straightforward, less motivational conceptual priming account. A key 
feature of semantic priming is that it increases the accessibility of related constructs 
(Neely, 1977; Förster & Liberman, 2007; for a meta-analysis, see DeCoster & Claypool, 
2004). For example, if an individual has to form a possible sentence from items such as 
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“leg break arm his” they will be more likely to view ambiguous targets as more hostile 
whereas priming "the hug boy kiss” will encourage more kind ratings (Srull & Wyer, 
1979). Indeed, previous research demonstrates that the direction flows towards the prime 
with only unambiguous and extreme exemplars resulting in a contrast effect (Herr, 
Sherman & Fazio, 1983). Subsequently, if the manipulations presented here were merely 
activating a semantic prime, one would expect that ‘warm’ manipulations would activate 
‘warm’ associations. However, the results here were the exact opposite. Individuals 
induced to feel either physically or socially warm preferred and activated 
physically/socially cool desires, while those that felt physically or socially cool preferred 
warmth. 
In addition, these results differ from what would expect from a goal-related prime. 
Indeed, research has demonstrated that goal primes activate desired end-states (Sela & 
Shiv, 2009; Forster, Liberman & Friedman, 2007). For example, work disentangling the 
often confounded question of when a prime activates a goal and when it activates a trait 
showed that goal directed primes are a function of discrepancies between the prime and 
the self (Sela & Shiv, 2009). For instance, past research has shown priming achievement 
made individuals more competitive (Bargh et al., 2001), priming helpfulness increased 
participants helpful behavior (Macrae & Johnston, 1998), and priming conformity 
increased group consensus (Epley & Gilovich, 1999). Once again, if our manipulations 
had activated a traditional goal prime, we would have expected that those who felt 
physically/socially warm (cool) to have a greater desire for warm (cool) products or 
environments. However, we found the opposite. 
Finally, one may wonder whether these results are simply explained with an 
intraconceptual embodied simulation explanation as opposed to with a conceptual 
metaphor framework (Landau, Meier & Keefer, 2010). As Landau and colleagues (2010) 
state, temperature related sensations, such as hugs, are typically related to friendliness. As 
such, the effects of temperature at the food court could be understood from an embodied 
context. However, drink temperature or social products are unlikely to be regularly 
associated with friendliness or temperature. Hence, our results suggest a metaphoric 
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overlap between social/physical warmth (concrete concept) and the abstract concept of 
social/physical warmth.  
Overall, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating the link between physiological 
experiences and people’s desire for social interaction through self-regulation. Instead of 
warmth promoting interpersonal affection and coolness promoting isolation, we find that 
people seek to achieve balance (e.g., desiring interactive products when cool and 
isolation when warm). This suggests that when one feels cool, people develop increased 
social affiliative motives; when one feels warm, people seek relatively more social 
isolation. More importantly, we extend this framework into consumption scenarios and 
development of social products, providing managerial implications for marketers. 
The current findings may benefit marketers in multiple ways. First, it is important for 
marketers to control environmental settings (e.g., room temperature) to initiate relational 
behavior. For example, it is often considered that live speed dating sites should operate in 
a “warm and cozy environment” to increase interpersonal affection for potential 
candidates. In contrast, we suggest that cooler rooms may encourage individuals to desire 
social remedies, such as developing interpersonal relations, in order to self-regulate from 
being cool. This research is also relevant to marketers seeking to develop social products. 
For instance, retail stores trying to sell social products (i.e., interactive toys) may 
encourage individuals to seek out social products by keeping their stores cooler. 
Previous research (e.g., Spangenberg, Crowley, & Henderson, 1996) suggests strongly 
that cues in the shopping environment can positively (or potentially detrimentally) affect 
product perceptions. Given that ambient temperature may have an effect on perceptions 
of social consumption (Ijzerman & Semin, 2010) and signals for social proximity (Fay & 
Maner, 2012), future research should delve into understanding more about how 
temperature (such as store temperature) affect one’s desire to socially interact with 
products and with others For example, while our research focused more on products, 
perhaps these results can be extended to service environments where interaction between 
the customer and the company representatives (i.e., salespeople) is highly encouraged. 
For example, would hair salons that encourage interactions with their customers be better 
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off by keeping their ambient temperature cooler? Future research should extend our 
findings into service environments where company-customer interactions are paramount. 
Moreover, being warm vs. boiling (cool vs. freezing) could be psychologically different 
for consumers. For instance, while warmth elicits feelings of comfort, hot may elicit 
feelings of anger or passion. Therefore, future research should also consider how 
different degrees of temperature may replicate or yield separate results from the ones we 
have shown in this research.  
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3 Chapter 3 
Warmth of our Regrets: Managing Regret Through Physiological 
Regulation Via Consumptive Behavior 
 
 Abstract 
This research suggests that experiencing action regret induces a change in psychological 
and physical warmth, motivating individuals to ameliorate that change via interaction 
with objects that are perceived to be physically or psychologically opposite in 
temperature. Experiment 1 revealed individuals experiencing action regret felt more self-
conscious emotions, and subsequently preferred cold (versus hot) drinks. Experiment 2 
replicated this effect and ruled out arousal as a possible alternative explanation. 
Experiment 3 furthered this link by demonstrating that those feeling more self-conscious 
emotions felt warmer and subsequently preferred cold (versus hot) drinks. Finally, 
experiment 4 found that advertisements manipulated for temperature (e.g., cold climate) 
mitigated the psychological effects of action regret. We interpret the results of these four 
studies within the emerging field of embodied cognition, which argues that our 
understanding of emotional concepts is grounded in, and can be influenced by, physical 
experiences.  
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 Introduction 
Regret is an aversive cognitive emotion that people are motivated to avoid, suppress, 
deny, and regulate should they experience it (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). It is a 
negative, cognitively-based emotional response experienced when realizing or imagining 
that our present situation would have been better had we acted differently (Zeelenberg, 
1999). For consumers, regret induces a painful sensation that arises as a result of 
comparing ‘what is’ with ‘what might have been’ (Sugden, 1985). In other words, regret 
transpires when an obtained outcome compares unfavorably with an outcome that could 
have been better had the individual chosen differently. Within a marketing context, 
consumers are constantly making choices that might lead to feelings of regret; 
understanding the processes that lead to ameliorating this experience is important for 
maintaining the well-being of consumers. As such, one key area of interest for marketers 
is to understand how the cognitive experience of regret might affect consumption 
behavior.  
Recent theories (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013) of emotion processing assert that our 
subjective mental experiences of emotion are a function of our bodily states. In line with 
an embodied perspective, emotions are thought to be generated by the individual’s 
perception of related physiological responses. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests bodily 
expressions and responses are closely tied to the processing and interpretation of 
emotional experiences (Damasio, 2000; Niedenthal et al., 2005; Niedenthal et al., 2009). 
For instance, fear is associated with certain bodily responses such as raised heart rate and 
goose bumps (Oosterwijk et al., 2010). Stepper and Strack (1993) suggest that specific 
bodily postures (e.g., upright posture) are associated with specific emotional response 
(e.g. pride). Even merely thinking about emotional content elicits certain facial 
expressions (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Physiological research demonstrates that 
emotional responses may result in certain forms of bodily stimulation, such as 
electrodermal activity (Glenberg et al., 2009). Hence, emotion processes are inherently 
linked with physiological responses, and contain psychobiological properties such as 
motor expression, action tendency, subjective experience, and emotion regulation 
(Fontaine et al., 2007). 
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Here, we argue the effects of experiencing regret on consumer behavior from an 
embodied cognitive perspective. Importantly, we move beyond merely documenting the 
physiological-psychological link between regret and consumption by uncovering the 
process mechanism that explains this relationship. Specifically, we show that 
experiencing a certain form of regret (i.e., action regret) results in increased perceptions 
of warmth via the experience of self-conscious emotions and creates a subsequent desire 
for cold (versus hot) products. Taken together, these findings help to define the 
psychological underpinnings of experienced regret within the context of embodied 
cognition theory and extend it into meaningful applications in marketing and consumer 
behavior from both a theoretical and managerial perspective. 
 Conceptual Background 
Individuals can regret their actions (errors of commission), as well as their inactions 
(errors of omission; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). For example, an individual can regret an 
active decision gone wrong (e.g., purchasing a stock that subsequently plunges in value), 
or regret failing to act (e.g., not purchasing a stock that subsequently rises in value). We 
use the terms action regret and inaction regret to denote whether the regret stems from 
an event in which one took action or failed to act. Prior research examining regret has 
shown that there are fundamental differences between regretful situations that result from 
action and regretful situations that result from inaction in terms of the distinct emotional 
patterns that are elicited (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). For instance, action regret (e.g. 
regretful situations that are caused by one’s actions) induces not only the emotion of 
regret but also self-conscious emotional experiences such as shame and guilt, whereas 
inaction regret (e.g. regretful situations that are caused by one’s inaction) similarly 
induces the emotion of regret but also wistful emotions such as longing and 
contemplation (Kedia & Hilton, 2011). Action regret typically results in increased 
internal attributions and self-focused counterfactural thinking (Byrne & McEleney, 1997; 
Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998; Zeelenberg, 
van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998). Subsequently, emotions such as shame, guilt, 
embarassment and remorse (generally considered to be among the consequences of 
evaluating oneself negatively) should be higher when experiencing situations of action 
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regret. On the other hand, emotions such as anger and frustration are a function of 
external attributions, and should occur in similar propensity for action and inaction regret. 
Finally, the feeling of regret reflects a temporal pattern in which situations of action 
regret tend to elicit greater regret in the short-term but not in the long-term. For example, 
while buying a stock that subsequently plummets tends to elicit greater immediate regret 
than holding onto that stock (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), other research that examines 
recalling regret later has found either no differences or even the opposite effect (Gilovich 
& Medvec, 1995; Kedia & Hilton, 2011; Zeelenberg et al., 2002). 
Notably, it is important to acknowledge that the emotional profiles (e.g., shame vs. 
wistfulness) resulting from the varying situations that elicit action vs. inaction regret are 
seen as separate from the regret emotion itself. Similarly, while regret may be seen as a 
type of self-conscious emotion, it is theoretically distinct from other self-conscious 
emotions such as shame, embarrassment, or disappointment. As Zeelenerg and Pieters 
(2007) note “regret is distinct from related other specific emotions such as anger, 
disappointment, envy, guilt, sadness and shame, and from general negative affect on the 
basis of its appraisals, experiential content and behavioral consequences.” (p.7). 
Individuals can feel regret without feeling shame or embarrassment, and they can 
experience shame and embarrassment without regret. Research examining both regret and 
shame find only modest correlations between the two (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). 
Further, Zeelenberg et al. (Zeelenberg et al., 1998) extended Roseman et al.’s (1994) 
ideas to compare the phenomenological differences between regret and disappointment. 
They found that regret was associated with items such as “[you] feel that you should have 
known better” or “[you] want to undo the event”, while disappointment was associated 
with “[you are] feeling powerless” or “[you] want to do nothing” (see Zeelenberg et al., 
1998 for more differences). Overall, those who experienced regret tended to rethink about 
past events, while those who experienced other negative self-conscious emotions tended 
to dismiss their negative experience. This explains why regret has been found to promote 
goal persistence, while disappointment has been found to promote goal abandonment 
(Zeelenberg et al., 2000). Individuals who regret are likely to set goals that are directed at 
improving one’s self, similarly to how a person becomes self-focused and seek 
replenishment when experiencing emptiness (Levontin, Ein-Gar, & Lee, 2015). 
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Taken together, we offer series of predictions based on individuals' desire to regulate 
their level of regret. We propose that consumers seek to ameliorate their experienced 
regret through consumptive acts. Moreover, we focus primarily on the situation type 
(e.g., action regret) as it involves the activation of self-conscious emotions.  
 Hypotheses Development 
Niedenthal (2008) suggests emotions are understood through an embodied framework 
where individual’s physical, cognitive, and other emotional properties are mapped 
together in the neural system. For instance, when experiencing nervousness, the concept 
of “nervous” in memory may be linked with rapid heart rate/dry mouth (physical), 
anticipation (cognitive), and fear/anxiety (other emotions), which together culminate the 
emotional experience. As such, modality-specific models of emotions assert that specific 
networks of experiences are stored and associated with a particular emotional response, 
allowing for easier interpretation and processing of emotional information (Niedenthal, et 
al., 2009).  
Recent research (Nummenmaa et al., 2013) demonstrates that certain emotions 
correspond with different physiological states. In their research, Nummenmaa and 
colleagues show that consciously felt emotions were associated with distinct perceptions 
of body temperature. More germane to this article, their findings imply that people feel 
warm when they feel shame or remorse. Further, there are additional reasons that 
experiencing these emotions should result in embodied warmth. For example, 
experiencing shame and remorse can cause blushing, a physiological response associated 
with vasoconstriction and warming (Shearn et al., 1990). We argue that because 
situations that lead to action regret activate these same self-conscious emotional states 
that have been linked to warmth, experiencing action regret should lead to increased 
perception of warmth. A pre-test confirmed that the recalling an experience of action 
regret differentially affects participant’s perception of ambient environmental 
temperature; participants instructed to remember an instance of action regret perceived 
the room to be warmer than those in the inaction regret condition. Specifically, 57 
undergraduate students (58% females) were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
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participants in the first condition were instructed to recall a situation where they 
experienced action regret deeply (e.g., regret something they have done), while 
participants in the second condition were instructed to recall a situation where they 
experienced inaction regret deeply (e.g., regretting something they failed to do). 
Following the completion of this task, participants were told that the building 
maintenance staff had requested that they estimate the current room temperature. The 
actual room temperature was not given to the participants but it ranged from 20 – 20.5°C 
(68-69 °F) during the experiment sessions. The mean outside temperature during the 
experiment over two days was 16.5 °C (62 °F), with an average temperature of 17°C 
(63°F) on the first day and 16°C (61°F) on the second day. Following the estimation of 
the room temperature, participants were debriefed and released. Overall, participants 
estimated ambient room temperature within a range from 55 to 75 degrees Fahrenheit. A 
one-way ANOVA revealed that the participants who recalled an action regret experience 
reported higher ambient room temperature than those in the inaction condition (Maction = 
69.89 °F vs. Minaction = 67.76 
°F; t(55) = 2.12, p < .05, η2p = .08).  
 The Link Between Consumption and Regulating Regret 
Extant consumer behavior research suggests that individuals use consumption to 
regulate both actual and symbolic discrepancies (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982). That is, 
people have an innate tendency to maintain balance, and embodied processes allow for 
self-regulation to occur in a consumption context (Lee, Rotman, & Perkins, 2014). As 
discrepancy increases, so does the desire for a consumptive object related ameliorating 
that discrepancy. For example, individuals who have their morality threatened show a 
greater desire for cleaning products (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), while social ostracism 
has been shown to lead to a greater desire for warm food and drink (Zhong & 
Leonardelli, 2008). Further, Bilz (2012) reveal that law students who use “dirty 
evidence” were more likely to choose a bottle of hand-sanitizer over a pen as a free gift. 
People who lied over voice mail desired mouthwash to purify the specific body part that 
involved the moral transgression (Lee & Schwarz, 2010). Relating to emotions, people 
who feel embarrassed exhibited coping strategies to hide or restore their face using 
consumptive objects (i.e., sunglasses/cosmetics) as a way to mitigate their negative 
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emotion (Dong, Huang, & Wyer, 2013). Overall, these results suggest that consumptive 
objects or experiences can be used as regulatory mechanism to achieve a physiological 
balance. Thus, we extend this logic to suggest people will seek to regulate their 
experienced regret through consumptive objects and consequently develop stronger 
preferences for products, thus ameliorating their feelings of regret. Here, we propose that 
individuals should be motivated to ameliorate this emotional warmth of regret using 
variety of temperature-related environmental objects (e.g., beverage products). 
In a review of the emotion-behavior link, Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1993) argue that rather than viewing the emotion-behavior link as 
emotion causing behavior, it should instead be viewed as behavior pursuing emotion. 
Specifically, Baumeister and colleagues argue that when individuals are in an aversive 
state (fearful, shameful, etc.), they will engage in behaviors in an attempt to regulate and 
thus achieve a positive emotional state. For example, it has long been established that 
sadness can cause helping behavior (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Cunningham, 
Steinberg, & Grev, 1980). However, when individuals are given a placebo and told that it 
would make emotional mood states immune to change, this resulted in less helping 
behavior (Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984). Other results have replicated this 
finding in different domains, showing that a ‘mood-freezing pill’ results in lower 
regulating behavior of eating and sadness or procrastination and anxiety (Tice, 
Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). 
Thus, we argue that the preference for cold for those experiencing situations of action 
regret should be the result of one’s experience of self-conscious emotions. Individuals 
who are feeling greater remorse, shame, or embarrassment should attempt to regulate this 
negative state. Further, because these states are tied to warmth (cf. Nummenmaa et al., 
2013), these individuals should be motivated to consume cold beverages as a regulatory 
mechanism. Conversely, other emotional states, such as anger, irritation, and arousal, 
which don’t systematically differ between the two forms of regret, should not be a 
predictive factor.  
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H1a: Individuals recalling a situation of action regret will prefer cold items to hot 
items. 
H1b: The relationship between recalling a situation of action regret and a 
preference for cold (versus hot) items is mediated by the feelings of self-
conscious emotions.  
Finally, an important function of the human mind is the ability to imagine external 
realities (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009). Past research has shown that imagining an experience 
can have similar effects as actual experiences (Dahl, Manchanda, & Argo, 2001). 
Individuals can experience various types of affective responses as a result of imagining 
others or imagining a situation (Dahl, et al., 2001; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). In the 
embodiment context, Niedenthal et al. (2005) states “just thinking about an object 
produces embodied states as if the object were actually there” (p. 187). Gangi, Sherman, 
and White (2011) show that participants that watched a video while imagining 
themselves flossing showed better flossing skills one week later. Related to temperature, 
imagined warmth or coldness (i.e., thinking about holding a cup of hot/iced coffee) 
showed similar embodied effects as previous studies, but only if the event was imagined 
from an egocentric (first-person) perspective (Macrae et al., 2013). These results are 
supported by Lorey and colleagues (2009), who found via neuroimaging that greater 
activity occurred in the sensorimotor regions of the brain when people imagined events 
and actions from a first-person, rather than third-person, perspective.  
In line with this extant research, we suggest that eliminating the effects of experienced 
regret may not be limited to situations where a physical product is available; merely 
imagining a consumption experience may mitigate the effects of experienced regret. 
Specifically, we investigate whether marketing promotions (advertisements) that feature 
attributes related to temperature can be a source for mitigating regret stemming from 
action. This notion builds on the emerging fields of sensory marketing (Elder & Krishna, 
2012; Krishna, 2012) and embodied cognition (Barsalou, 1999; Wilson-Mendenhall et 
al., 2011), which suggests that consumption-based objects or materials can be an 
effective regulator of consumption-related emotions (i.e., regret). Thus, we propose: 
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H2: After experiencing action regret, individuals who view an advertisement for a 
cold-climate vacation will experience less regret than those who view and 
advertisement for a warm-climate vacation. 
 Overview of Studies 
Here, we report four experiments that investigate the link among regret, temperature, 
self-conscious emotions, and subsequent consumer behavior. In experiments 1-3 (H1a 
and H1b), we investigate whether individuals seek to self-regulate their experienced 
action regret via consumptive objects (i.e., hot or cold drink) and whether this effect is 
mediated by self-conscious emotions. Finally, in experiment 4 (H2), we use 
consumption-based materials (advertisements that are manipulated for temperature) to 
investigate whether imagined embodied states can ameliorate experienced regret. 
 Experiment 1 
In experiment 1, we investigate whether people will attempt to regulate their experienced 
action regret through consumptive objects and consequently develop stronger preferences 
for products that are capable of doing so (e.g., cold drinks). We seek to demonstrate that 
consumptive objects or experiences can be used as a regulatory strategy to ameliorate 
physiological imbalance that results from the experience of self-conscious emotion 
following action regret. 
Procedure 
One hundred sixty-five individuals completed an online experiment via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Due to failed attention checks 
and missing data, eight responses were eliminated, leaving 157 participants (66.7% male, 
mean age = 31.66). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
participants were either instructed to recall a situation where they experienced action 
regret deeply or where they experienced inaction regret deeply. Participants were then 
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asked to report their perceptions of self-conscious emotions. Specifically, participants 
were asked whether they felt the four negative self-conscious emotions as reported in 
Kedia & Hilton (2011): shame, remorse, embarrassment, and guilt. The four items 
showed strong reliability (α = .87) and were averaged into a single self-conscious 
emotion construct. Perceptions of other emotions (anger, irritation, frustration, disgust, 
contemplation, and concern) were also collected. Next, participants were provided with 
10 food/drink items to consider, and were instructed to click on the items they currently 
desired using the computer mouse. Five of the presented items were hot items (hot coffee, 
hot chocolate, hot green tea, apple cider, and soup) while the other five items were cold 
items (iced latte, ice cream, cold Gatorade, a soft drink, and cold beer). After completing 
the choice task, participants completed a number of demographic items, were debriefed, 
and then released. 
Dependent Variables. For the dependent measure, a preference index was created (see 
Lee et al. 2014) by calculating the difference between the number of hot items chosen 
and cold items chosen and divided by the total number of items chosen. A zero indicates 
an equal number of hot and cold items chosen (neutral preference), a positive number 
indicates a preference for hot items, and a negative number indicates a preference for 
cold items. Participants on average selected a total of 2.38 items, comprising of an 
average 1.40 hot items and .98 cold items. 
Results 
Consistent with our theorizing and the results of Kedia and Hilton (2011), our results 
demonstrated a significant effect of condition on self-conscious emotions (i.e., shame, 
remorse, embarrassment, and guilt; t(158) = 3.73, p < .001, η2p = .08), with action regret 
resulting in stronger feelings of self-conscious emotions (M = 4.87, SD = 1.65) compared 
to inaction regret (M = 3.90, SD = 1.62), but not for other felt emotions. The only 
exceptions were for disgust and concern, but these emotions did not predict preferences 
for cold/hot drinks (for a list of all emotion descriptive statistics, see table 1. Supporting 
H1, mediation analysis (Model 4, Hayes, 2013) with a bootstrapping procedure (5,000 
resamples) revealed the predicted indirect effect; the feeling of self-conscious emotions 
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mediated the influence of the regret condition (1 = Action Regret, 2 = Inaction Regret) on 
preference for cold versus hot products (β = .078, (95% CI: [.018, .187], κ2 = .059). In 
short, individuals in the action regret condition reported feeling more self-conscious 
emotions and subsequently preferred more cold items, ostensibly because they longed to 
achieve a temperature balance through self-regulatory decisions. 
Moreover, while there were also significant differences for the emotions disgust and 
concern between the action and inaction regret conditions, neither of those emotions 
predicted preferences for cold vs. hot drinks (β = .029, 95% CI [-.02, .11, κ2 = .005] and β 
= .027, 95% CI [-.02, .07], κ2 = .026 respectively). For a summary table of all indirect 
effects, see table 2. In addition, to rule out the argument that our effect was driven by 
differences in preference of hot or of items in general, we computed mediation analysis 
with self-conscious emotions on cold, hot and total items independently. As predicted, 
mediation was found for cold items only (β = -.12, 95% CI [-.27, -.02], κ2 = .052) but not 
for hot items (β = .07, 95% CI [-.03, .24], κ2 = .031) or total items (β = -.041, 95% CI [-
.25, .13], κ2 = .013). 
Experiment 1 Discussion 
The results of experiment 1 support H1. Following the regret manipulation, participants 
who experienced action regret reported feeling more self-conscious emotions (e.g. guilt 
and remorse) and subsequently preferred cold items to hot items. Additionally, this 
relationship was mediated by the intensity of those self-conscious emotions. These results 
further bolster the argument that experiencing regret, similar to other sources of 
emotional warmth or cold (Bargh & Shalev, 2012; IJzerman et al., 2012), can lead to the 
physiological experience of cold versus warm and a desire to ameliorate that feeling via 
consumption behavior. Further, these results discount the notion that embodied effects 
are simply a consequence of increased accessibility: if this was the case, then we would 
expect to observe a preference for warm or hot foods. Finally, because individuals appear 
to be attempting to regulate their physiological temperature by preferring cold versus 
warm foods, we suggest that experiencing psychological heat resulting from experiencing 
regret can affect product perceptions and desirability.  
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However, the results of experiment 1 do not rule out the possibility that increased arousal 
or the intensity of the emotion of regret due to situations of action regret, rather than the 
self-conscious emotions, are the driving force behind the preference for cold (versus hot) 
drinks. It is possible, rather than self-conscious emotions affecting perceptions of warmth 
and subsequent preference for cold, that our effect is driven simply by the fact that action 
regret can be a more intense emotion and may subsequently result in greater arousal or 
regret. To rule out this possibility, experiment 2 was designed to assess the intensity of 
regret and arousal level and determine whether they may be competing explanations.  
 Experiment 2 
Procedure 
One hundred seventeen participants (53% male, mean age = 34.78) were recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Eight participants were excluded for failed attention checks 
and missing data. Participants were assigned to a 2 (Regret type: action/inaction) x 2 (Tea 
preference: hot/cold) between-subjects design. As in the previous experiment, regret was 
manipulated by asking participants to “recall a time when you experienced a lot of regret 
as a result of your own actions/decisions”, while in the inaction regret condition 
participants were asked, “Recall a time when you experienced a lot of regret as a result of 
failing to act, (e.g., missed opportunities)”. As in study 1, participants were then asked to 
type a description of their experience in a text box and then report their current emotions 
regarding the experience (Kedia and Hilton, 2011). As in experiment 1, participants were 
asked whether they felt shame, remorse, embarrassment, and guilt along with a number of 
other emotions (anger, irritation, frustration, etc.). In addition, to rule out the effect of 
arousal and regret, this experiment also employed a 10-item (α = .85) perceived arousal 
questionnaire (Anderson, Anderson, & Deuser, 1996; Anderson, Deuser, & Deneve, 
1995) and a single-item regret question (how much do you regret this experience?). 
Participants were then shown an image of a loose leaf tea product manipulated for 
temperature. In the hot tea preference condition, participants were told that the tea was 
best served hot, while in the cold tea preference condition, participants were told the tea 
was best served cold (Lee, et al., 2014). Participants were then asked how much they 
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currently desired the tea (3 item scale, e.g., “How desirable is the tea?” 1 = not at all 
desirable, 7 = very desirable, α = .97). 
Results 
As in Experiment 1, recalling an experience action regret resulted in significantly greater 
self-conscious emotions (M = 4.84, SD = 1.69) compared to recalling an experience of 
inaction regret (M = 3.43, SD = 1.81; t(115) = 4.34, p < .001, η2p = .14). However, there 
were no significant differences on arousal between action regret (M = 4.41, SD = .67) 
and inaction regret (M = 4.47, SD = .81; t(115) = -.37, p =.72,). Similarly, there were no 
significant effects for the other, non-self-conscious emotions (e.g. anger) or the emotion 
of regret (Maction= 5.66, SDaction = 1.80 vs. Minaction = 5.53, SDinaction = 1.67, t(115) = .40, p 
=.69). Please refer to table 3 and 4 for details.  
An ANOVA demonstrated the predicted interaction of regret type on tea preference (F(1, 
113) = 7.74, p =.006, η2p = .06). Simple main effects revealed that participants preferred 
the cold drink more after experiencing action regret (M = 5.33, SD = 1.27) versus 
inaction regret (M = 4.47, SD = 1.97; p =.03), whereas participants marginally preferred 
the warm drink more after inaction regret (M = 5.49. SD = 1.56) compared to action 
regret (M = 4.79, SD = 1.56; p =.08). See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of these 
results. 
Finally, moderated mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013, Model 14) with a bootstrapping 
procedure (5,000 resamples) revealed the same mediation pattern as described in 
experiment 1. Specifically, the relationship between regret condition (1 = Action Regret, 
2 = Inaction Regret) and preference for tea was significantly mediated through self-
conscious emotions for cold tea (β = -.41, (95% CI: [-.963, -.061]), but not for hot tea, (β 
= -.16, (95% CI: [-.460, .086]). That is, after recalling an instance of action regret, people 
reported more self-conscious emotions and subsequently preferred the cold tea, but not 
the hot tea. Further, neither level of arousal, regret, or any of the non-self-conscious 
emotions (See Table 5) mediated the aforementioned relationship. The one exception was 
disgust; however, this effect disappeared when controlling for self-conscious emotions (β 
= -.04, (95% CI: [-.251 .087]). 
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of Experiment 3 results 
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Experiment 2 Discussion 
The results of experiment 2 further support H1. As in experiment 1, participants who 
recalled an experience of action regret felt more self-conscious emotions and 
subsequently preferred cold items to hot items. In addition, experiment 2 ruled out the 
potential effect of arousal and overall regret. Participants did not feel more regret or 
greater arousal from recalling an experience that lead to action versus inaction regret.  
However, the results of the first two experiments have not yet established the mechanism 
by which self-conscious feelings due to experiencing action regret affects preferences for 
cold drinks. We suggest that preference for colder drinks may be due to people feeling 
literally warmer as a result of feeling these self-conscious emotions. Specifically, we 
argue that experiencing self-conscious emotions after action regret leads to greater 
perceptions of warmth, which in turn predicts the consumption of cold vs. warm drinks. 
Thus, experiment 3 was designed to test the mechanisms.  
 Experiment 3 
Procedure  
One hundred forty participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. We 
eliminated 19 responses due to failed attention checks and incomplete responses, leaving 
a total of 121. As in experiment 2, participants were asked to either recall an instance of 
action regret or inaction regret. In order to better control for differences in time, we asked 
participants to recall an instance of regret in the past 2 weeks. Following the regret 
manipulation, participants were asked the extent to which they felt various emotions, 
regret, and level of arousal (10 questions, α = .75) using the same scales as experiment 3. 
Different from experiment 2, the regret measure was changed to a more robust, 4-item 
regret scale (Lee & Cotte, 2009; α = .80). Next, participants were asked whether recalling 
their experience made them feel more flush and warm (e.g. Writing about the experience 
made me feel 'flush in the face,' and Writing about the experience made me warmer, 1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree, 3 questions, α = .83) and were aggregated into a 
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single ‘flushness’ construct. Finally, participants completed the same tea desirability 
measure as in experiment 2 (α = .98).  
Results 
Consistent with experiments 1 and 2, recalling and the experience of action regret 
resulted in feeling significantly more self-conscious emotions (M = 4.89, SD = 1.31) 
compared to inaction regret (M = 4.12, SD = 1.71) t(119) = 2.79, p =.006, η2p = .06). 
Further, we found no effect on the multi-item score of regret (Maction = 4.61, SD = 1.01 
versus MInaction = 4.37, SD = 1.16; t(119) = 1.23, p =.22) or arousal (t(119) = -1.70, p 
=.09, Maction = 4.13, SD = .44 vs. MInaction = 4.28, SD = .47). While a few main effects 
related to the other, non-self-conscious emotions were obtained, these effects disappeared 
when we controlled for self-conscious emotions. Regressing all of the emotion measures 
on the measure of flushness revealed that only the self-conscious emotions (shame, guilt, 
embarrassment, remorse) significantly predicted flushness (β = .32, p =.001, all other p’s 
> .15). As one might expect, anger was also correlated with flushness, r = .22, p = .02. 
However, it was also highly correlated with self-conscious emotions r = .43, p < .001. 
When both anger and self-conscious emotions were regressed, only the self-conscious 
emotions significantly predicted flushness (β = .29, p = .003), while anger did not (β = 
.09, p = .34). Importantly, the emotion of regret did not predict flushness, (β = .093, p = 
.31) nor did level of arousal (β = .091, p = .32), providing further evidence that the 
feelings of warmth were a function of self-conscious emotions and not other emotional 
states. Please see table 6 and 7 for details. 
A path analysis was computed on our full model. The model showed strong fit (χ2 = 
10.94, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .028, TLI = .96). As a point of comparison, substituting self-
conscious emotions with arousal (χ2 = 16.92, CFI = .71, RMSEA = .076, TLI = .57), 
anger (χ2 = 16.05, CFI = .82, RMSEA = .071, TLI = .72) or regret (χ2 = 14.78, CFI = .77, 
RMSEA = .063, TLI = .65), all showed significantly worse fit. Lastly, there was a 
significant flushness by tea-condition interaction on desirability, β = .20, p =.018. 
Examining the interaction reveals an effect of flushness for cold tea (t(119) = 4.08, p < 
.001), but no effect for hot tea (t(119) = 1.21, p =.22). To provide additional support for 
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our model, we also computed a moderated mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013, Model 14) 
with 5000 bootstraps assessing the link between self-conscious emotions to preference 
for cold versus hot tea. Consistent with our theorizing, the effect of self-conscious 
emotions on drink preference was mediated by feelings of flushness for cold drinks (β = 
.187, SE = .07, [95% CI: .08, .35]), but not for hot drinks (β = .05, SE = .04, [95% CI: -
.02, .15]). Please see Figure 3 for the theoretical model along with the path analysis. 
Experiment 3 Discussion 
The results of experiment 3 provide additional evidence for the relationship between 
feeling self-conscious emotions due to experiencing action regret and consumption 
preferences. Specifically, individuals who experience action regret experience greater 
self-conscious emotions which in turn lead to greater feelings of warmth (flushness) and 
subsequently desire for colder drinks. This is an important finding as it shows the process 
mechanism that underlies the regret-consumption regulatory link. 
In the next experiment, we test hypothesis 2 by investigating whether the effects of 
experiencing regret can be mitigated via imagined experience. Previous research suggests 
that imagining warmth or coldness (i.e., thinking about holding a cup of hot/iced coffee) 
can result in embodied responses when an event was imagined from an egocentric (first-
person) perspective (Macrae, et al., 2013). In line with this notion, we suggest that the 
effects of experienced regret may not be limited to situations where a physical product is 
available. We believe merely imagining a consumption experience can mitigate the 
effects of experienced regret. Specifically, we investigate whether marketing promotions 
(advertisements) that feature attributes related to temperature can be a source for 
mitigating action regret. This notion builds on the emerging fields of sensory marketing 
(Elder & Krishna, 2012; Krishna, 2012) and embodied cognition (Barsalou, 1999; 
Wilson-Mendenhall, et al., 2011), which suggests that consumption-based objects or 
materials can be an effective regulator of consumption-related emotions (i.e., regret).  
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Figure 3:  Theoretical framework and path analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: SCE = Self-Conscious Emotions. Dotted line indicates non-significant paths 
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 Experiment 4 
Procedure 
One hundred thirty-seven participants completed an online experiment via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Eighteen participants were eliminated due to incomplete responses or 
failing the attention check, leaving a final tally of 119 participants (63.9% male, mean 
age = 29.76). Participants were assigned to a 2 (Regret: action / inaction) x 2 
(Advertisement temperature: winter / summer) between subjects design. Regret was 
manipulated using a stock-choice manipulation. A pretest (n = 52) confirmed that 
individuals felt considerably more self-conscious emotions after a situation of action 
regret (M = 3.28, SD = 1.90) compared to inaction regret (M = 1.79, SD = 1.06). t(50) = 
3.61, p = .001). 
Each participant was provided with information about a fictitious pharmaceutical stock 
(Verap Pharmaceuticals, current stock price $2.50). Participants had the option to invest 
or not invest in the stock. To induce action regret, participants who invested in the stock 
were later informed that the stock price dropped by to $1.25 (a 50% loss on their 
investment). To induce inaction regret, participants who did not invest in the stock were 
later informed that the stock price rose to $3.75 (a 50% gain on their investment). 53.8% 
of participants (n = 64) chose to invest and experienced action regret, while 46.2% (n = 
55) chose not to invest and experienced inaction regret.  
Following the regret manipulation, participants were instructed to review an 
advertisement for a Royal Caribbean cruise vacation. The advertisements were 
manipulated such that half of the participants viewed an ad promoting an Alaskan 
adventure, while the other half viewed an ad that was promoting a Caribbean adventure. 
Participants were then instructed to imagine themselves on the cruise, and then asked 
questions about what it would be like to be on this particular vacation. After imagining 
themselves on the cruise, participants were asked to estimate the temperature (in 
Fahrenheit) of the vacation’s location. Immediately following these questions, 
participants were instructed to complete a four-item seven-point Likert regret scale  
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(regret due to foregone alternatives; Lee and Cotte 2009) regarding the stock choice 
(Verap) that they have made earlier. The scale was anchored with strongly disagree and 
strongly agree. Sample items include, “I regret the choice I made” and “I should have 
chosen differently than the one I decided” (α = .92). In addition to these questions, we 
collected demographic variables along with their happiness; however, these variables did 
not influence the overall results and thus are omitted from final analysis. The 
advertisements are included in the appendix. 
Results. Analysis of the temperature estimation measure revealed that participants in the 
Caribbean advertisement condition estimated the temperature to be higher than people in 
the Alaska advertisement condition (MCaribbean = 67.38 °F versus MAlaska = 30.18 °F, t(115) 
= 7.90, p < .001). This result served as a manipulation check. Supporting hypotheses 3, 
ANOVA analysis revealed the predicted interaction (F(1, 116) = 9.92, p < .01, η2p = .08). 
Simple effects revealed that participants experiencing action regret experienced less 
regret after observing the Alaskan cruise advertisement than the Caribbean cruise 
advertisement (MAlaska = 4.53; MCaribbean = 5.21; F(1,116) = 3.64 p =.06). Interestingly, 
simple effects revealed that participants experiencing inaction regret experienced less 
regret after observing the Caribbean cruise advertisement compared to those who 
observed the Alaskan cruise advertisement (MCaribbean = 3.49 vs. MAlaska = 4.46; F(1,116) 
= 6.30 , p < .05). Finally, consistent with prior studies on the temporal pattern of regret 
(Gilovich & Medvec, 1995), a main effect of type of regret obtained, such that people 
regretted action regret more than inaction regret (at least in the short term; F(1,116) = 
11.70, p < .01, η2p = .08). Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of these results. 
Experiment 4 Discussion 
The results of experiment 4 support hypotheses H2. Following the action regret 
manipulation, participants who viewed an advertisement that promoted a cold-climate 
destination reported feeling less regret than those who viewed an advertisement that 
promoted a warm-climate destination. As noted, the main of effect of regret in this study 
is consistent with prior research in which situations of action regret tend to elicit greater 
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Figure 4: Graphical representation of Experiment 4 results 
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regret in the short-term but not in the long-term (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982). Counterfactual thoughts are easier to generate following an action, but 
also prompt greater dissonance reducing strategies (see Gilovich & Medvec, 1995 for a 
review). Whereas Experiment 1, 2, and 3 employed a recall task which measured the 
regret of events that happened in the past, this study differed in that it measured regret 
almost immediately after a decision was made.  
Interestingly, those participants who experienced inaction regret and subsequently viewed 
an advertisement that promoted a warm-climate destination reported less regret than 
those participants who viewed an advertisement that promoted a cold-climate destination. 
Part of this reason may be that a warm cruise is simply more relaxing and thus more 
calming than a cold cruise. This is consistent with previous research that suggests that 
imagining an experience is can be similar to an actual experience (Dahl, et al., 2001). 
Overall, we find that imagining a consumptive experience leads to self-regulatory 
behavior, rather than the effects reported by Macrae et al. (2013). Thus, we believe that 
this is the first time that imagining a particular consumptive experience via advertising 
has been shown to alleviate an experience of an emotion.  
 General Discussion 
In summary, we suggest that experiencing regret induces a change in psychological 
temperature, motivating individuals to ameliorate that change via interaction with 
consumptive objects that are perceived to be physically or psychologically opposite in 
temperature. We find that action regret induces self-conscious emotions which in turn 
create warmth (flushness) that leads to desire for colder drinks. Furthermore, we find that 
promotional materials, such as advertisements that represent warm or cold climates or 
beverages that can be served either hot or cold, can serve as a source for temperature 
mitigation and regret reduction. Further, we contribute to our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying embodied cognition effects. Although other research has 
examined the role of construct accessibility (e.g., Lee & Schwarz, 2012), we demonstrate 
that some embodied effects are the result of regulatory behaviors that are attempts to 
achieve physiological balance. One might wonder why our results lead to compensatory 
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and not an assimilation effect. Recent research (Zhang & Risen, 2014; Zhang, Risen, & 
Hosey, 2014) has demonstrated that embodied effects can result in goal activation. 
Specifically, when an unpleasant state is activated, individuals are motivated to engage in 
behaviors that undo that physical or psychological state. Similarly, we argue that just as 
an individual will seek to regulate their temperature by desiring to cool off when they are 
too warm (e.g., homeostasis, see Benzinger, 1969), individuals will desire products that 
are opposite in perceived temperature to psychologically “cool off” after the unpleasant 
experience of regret.  
Given that emotional responses to experiencing action regret are negative (Gilovich & 
Medvec, 1995), we posit that the motivation to regulate is due to a desire to alleviate a 
negative emotional state. Research has shown that people are motivated to seek remedies 
to reduce the negative emotions that they are feeling (Cooper et al., 1995). Thus, it is 
reasonable to believe that regulatory behavior observed here is a response to people’s 
desire to reduce their regretful emotion. If one was to experience a positive emotion (e.g., 
joy), it is unlikely that they will employ such strategies to regulate their positive state. 
These behaviors also coincide with research on compensatory consumption. Indeed, prior 
research has demonstrated that individuals attempt to use products to “fill their emotional 
gap”. For example, individuals made to feel powerless seek products that help them 
maintain or enhance their status (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). We contribute to this 
domain of literature by demonstrating that such regulatory compensatory effects can be 
embodied in nature. To our knowledge, no research to date has examined how regret 
might affect physical perceptions of temperature or how the physiological response to the 
cognitive emotion of regret might affect subsequent consumptive behavior, and whether 
marketing efforts (i.e., advertisements) might mitigate the effects of regret.  
More importantly, we reveal that action regret can be mitigated through getting people to 
imagine a cool temperature setting via advertisements. This parallels the findings of 
Strack, Martin, and Strepper (1988) who showed that a cartoon comic was perceived 
funnier when the viewer’s face was able to respond with a smile vs. when the viewer was 
unable to smile due to interference (i.e., holding a pen in the mouth). Further, interrelated 
research demonstrates that Botox injections (hindering muscle movement of the face) 
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were associated with reduced affective experiences and impaired processing of emotional 
words (Davis et al., 2010; Havas et al., 2010). Taken together, given that emotional 
responses are associated with certain physical experiences, impairing the bodily 
experience would subsequently impair individual’s ability to realize their felt emotion. 
Hence, when we asked individuals to imagine experiencing a vacation in a location 
known to be opposite in physical temperature to what they were feeling emotionally, we 
believe it impaired their emotional response to experience regret. 
Finally, although this paper presents novel evidence linking emotions to an embodied 
physiological process and the first evidence demonstrating an embodied element of 
regret, it does lead us to an interesting inquiry: if feelings of regret guide us toward more 
positive behavior in the future, why would ameliorating the effects of regret via 
embodied methods be adaptive? The resolution to this inquiry might be that we as 
humans need to “wipe the slate clean” of our regret, through whatever means available - 
once encoded into the memory of a regretted experience, there is no more need for a 
moment-to-moment reminder of one’s negative behavior. In this sense, embodied 
responses such as those described here are just one of any number of mechanisms for 
achieving this. Moreover, individuals who are unable to move on from regret may exhibit 
a number of mental health issues. For example, past research has demonstrated a 
connection between regret and both anxiety and depression (Roese et al., 2009). In this 
instance, we suggest that using temperature may provide an important regulatory 
mechanism for assisting with these types of health concerns and improving people's 
overall well-being. 
Understanding why consumers feel regret is critical to marketers as it is part of their 
objective to minimize the negative emotion experienced by their customers. Here, we 
provide a simple solution for businesses to help ameliorate the effects of consumer regret. 
If people are experiencing action regret, a customer service attendant can offer a cold 
drink to subtly mitigate their negative emotion. Finally, companies trying to sell ‘risky’ 
products (e.g. one that may elicit action regret) would likely benefit from keeping the 
store a little cooler or offering colder drinks as samples. Exploring the link between risk 
and temperature may be a fruitful investigation in the future, especially in retail settings. 
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 Limitations and Future Directions 
With respect to limitations, it is important to acknowledge that the temperature 
measurements employed in the current research are perceived, rather than objectively 
measured. Given that we did not provide thermometers to our participants, it is difficult 
to assume that their bodily temperature was affected by our manipulation of regret. Thus, 
future research should incorporate people’s actual bodily temperature to see whether 
there is a true connection between regret and bodily temperature. Additionally, in 
experiment 4, we acknowledge that it is possible that the thought of an Alaskan adventure 
may be unpleasant (compared to the thought of a Caribbean adventure) and that the 
intensity of the emotion provoked may differ as a result. Moreover, it may be more 
appropriate to test this theory in retail settings to see how retailer can use advertisements 
to reduce the level of regret that individuals may experience from a purchase. 
We believe that the embodied phenomenon discovered in this research is not just limited 
to regret. Future research may benefit from investigating regulatory mechanisms in other 
negatively-laden emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, shame, fear, depression). Given that our 
research shows that products or ads can mitigate people’s level of regret, it may be a 
worthwhile endeavor to investigate whether physiological remedies (e.g., hot/cold drink) 
can also mitigate psychological discrepancies that arise from other negative emotions. 
Hence, researchers are encouraged to further explore this connection to assist marketers 
in alleviating the negative emotions experienced by consumers. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for emotions felt for action vs. inaction regret  
Emotion Condition Mean SD 
Guilt* Action Regret 4.90 1.972 
Inaction Regret 3.75 2.054 
Embarrassment* Action Regret 4.74 1.836 
Inaction Regret 3.56 2.048 
Shame* Action Regret 4.68 2.036 
Inaction Regret 3.55 2.068 
Remorse* Action Regret 5.33 1.732 
Inaction Regret 4.72 1.928 
Anger Action Regret 3.30 1.806 
Inaction Regret 3.43 2.008 
Disgust* Action Regret 3.65 1.944 
Inaction Regret 2.79 1.862 
Frustration Action Regret 4.21 1.849 
Inaction Regret 3.97 2.020 
Irritation Action Regret 3.91 1.811 
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Inaction Regret 3.60 2.086 
Contemplation Action Regret 3.93 1.766 
Inaction Regret 3.56 1.810 
Wistfulness Action Regret 3.23 1.886 
Inaction Regret 3.53 1.941 
Concern* Action Regret 3.83 1.948 
 Inaction Regret 3.01 1.805 
Surprise Action Regret 2.54 1.525 
 Inaction Regret 2.21 1.339 
`   * p < .05   
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Table 2: Bootstrapping mediation analyses (Experiment 2) 
Emotion B SE 95% CI 
Self-Conscious 
Emotions (Aggregate) 
.078 .038 .021, .174 
Guilt .078 .041 .017, .186 
Embarrassment .084 .041 .024, .191 
Shame .045 .033 .003, .135 
Remorse .021 .022 -.008. .083 
Anger .001 .011 -.016, .035 
Disgust .029 .034 -.028, .111 
Frustration .004 .02 -.033, .054 
Irritation .006 .014 -.010, .058 
Contemplation -.008 .019 -.065, .016 
Wistfulness -.005 .009 -.035, .005 
Concern .027 .029 -.019, .100 
Surprise .014 .020 -.012, .073 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for emotions felt for action vs. inaction regret  
Emotion Condition Mean SD 
Regret Action Regret 5.66 1.80 
Inaction Regret 5.53 1.67 
Guilt* Action Regret 4.73 2.05 
Inaction Regret 3.28 2.15 
Embarrassment* Action Regret 4.77 2.00 
Inaction Regret 3.15 2.11 
Shame* Action Regret 4.69 2.03 
Inaction Regret 2.91 2.11 
Remorse* Action Regret 5.19 1.79 
Inaction Regret 4.40 2.09 
Anger Action Regret 3.75 2.08 
Inaction Regret 3.36 2.04 
Disgust* Action Regret 4.02 2.01 
Inaction Regret 2.91 1.97 
Frustration Action Regret 4.63 2.05 
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Inaction Regret 4.17 1.95 
Irritation Action Regret 4.34 2.08 
Inaction Regret 3.87 1.95 
Contemplation Action Regret 3.86 1.62 
Inaction Regret 3.34 1.95 
Longing Action Regret 3.42 1.97 
Inaction Regret 3.79 1.92 
Surprise* Action Regret 2.56 1.55 
Inaction Regret 1.92 1.34 
Concern Action Regret 3.53 1.98 
Inaction Regret 2.92 1.94 
* p < .05 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for arousal felt for action vs. inaction regret  
Arousal Condition Mean SD 
Active Action Regret 2.83 1.18 
 Inaction Regret 2.77 1.32 
Drowsy Action Regret 6.17 0.94 
 Inaction Regret 6.30 1.03 
Lively Action Regret 2.66 1.17 
 Inaction Regret 2.60 1.34 
Exhausted Action Regret 6.16 1.07 
 Inaction Regret 6.23 1.10 
Sleepy Action Regret 6.30 1.02 
 Inaction Regret 6.40 0.93 
Vigorous Action Regret 2.22 1.15 
 Inaction Regret 2.32 1.31 
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Alert Action Regret 3.14 1.18 
 Inaction Regret 3.36 1.24 
Dull Action Regret 6.34 0.91 
 Inaction Regret 6.48 0.87 
Fatigued Action Regret 6.25 0.93 
 Inaction Regret 6.13 1.24 
Powerful Action Regret 2.11 1.16 
 Inaction Regret 2.13 1.30 
* p < .05 
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Table 5: Mediation Analyses for Experiment 3 
Emotion Tea Type β SE 95% CI 
Self-Conscious Emotions 
(Aggregate) 
Hot -.16 .14 -.460, .086 
Cold -.41 .22 -.963, -.061 
Regret Hot -.013 .043 -.139, .042 
Cold .009 .059 -.05, .19 
Guilt Hot -.097 .126 -.383, .133 
Cold -.291 .184 -.766, -.028 
Embarrassment  Hot -.108 .123 -.372, .131 
Cold -.308 .213 -.84, .011 
Shame Hot -.188 .151 -.510, .091 
Cold -.418 .220 -.965, -.084 
Remorse Hot -.062 .067 -.248, .032 
Cold -.209 .158 -.623,-.003 
Anger Hot -.062 .068 -.258, .035 
Cold -.036 .073 -.301, .034 
Disgust Hot -.089 .100 -.327, .079 
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Cold -.363 .187 -.842, -.091 
Frustration Hot .054 .073 -.026, .288 
Cold -.005 .075 -.201, .112 
Irritation Hot .034 .062 .038, .239 
Cold .008 .081 -.151, .182 
Contemplation Hot .043 .080 -.034, .322 
Cold .005 .078 -.150, .175 
Wistfulness Hot .065 .100 -.074, .330 
Cold .023 .059 -.041, .218 
Concern Hot .110 .095 -.002, .400 
Cold -.201 .149 -.621, .015 
Surprise Hot .034 .078 -.090, .233 
Cold -.232 .14 -.641, -.041 
Arousal 
(Aggregate) 
Hot -.001 .037 -.090, .064 
Cold .003 .070 -.126, .169 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for emotions felt for action vs. inaction regret  
Emotion Condition Mean SD 
Regret Action Regret 5.61 1.01 
Inaction Regret 5.37 1.16 
Guilt* Action Regret 4.84 1.74 
Inaction Regret 4.17 2.12 
Embarrassment* Action Regret 4.87 1.56 
Inaction Regret 3.57 2.12 
Shame* Action Regret 4.60 1.83 
Inaction Regret 3.93 2.17 
Remorse* Action Regret 5.25 1.63 
Inaction Regret 4.81 1.81 
Anger Action Regret 3.99 1.85 
Inaction Regret 3.43 2.02 
Disgust* Action Regret 3.67 1.95 
Inaction Regret 2.61 1.73 
Frustration Action Regret 4.73 1.83 
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Inaction Regret 4.28 1.94 
Irritation* Action Regret 4.63 1.74 
Inaction Regret 3.93 1.85 
Contemplation* Action Regret 4.34 1.68 
 Inaction Regret 3.37 2.15 
Wistfulness Action Regret 3.58 1.73 
 Inaction Regret 3.46 2.19 
Concern* Action Regret 3.99 1.75 
 Inaction Regret 2.83 1.88 
Surprise* Action Regret 2.90 1.75 
 Inaction Regret 2.02 1.38 
Arousal 
(Aggregate) 
Action Regret 
Inaction Regret 
4.14 
4.28 
.44 
.47 
* p < .05    
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics for arousal felt for action vs. inaction regret  
Emotion Condition Mean SD 
Active 
 
Action Regret 2.67 1.12 
Inaction Regret 2.65 1.18 
Drowsy 
 
Action Regret 6.18 .88 
Inaction Regret 6.36 1.00 
Lively 
 
Action Regret 2.39 1.04 
Inaction Regret 2.54 1.08 
Exhausted 
 
Action Regret 6.21 .97 
Inaction Regret 6.48 .90 
Sleepy 
 
Action Regret 6.10 .97 
Inaction Regret 6.35 .97 
Vigorous 
 
Action Regret 2.00 1.06 
Inaction Regret 2.31 1.11 
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Alert 
 
Action Regret 3.27 1.13 
Inaction Regret 3.50 1.08 
Dull* 
 
Action Regret 6.00 1.01 
Inaction Regret 6.41 1.00 
Fatigued 
 
Action Regret 6.12 .98 
Inaction Regret 6.22 1.06 
* p < .05 
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4  Chapter 4 
The Utility of Sadness: 
Exploring the Consequences of Sad Consumption 
 
 Abstract 
Although consumers typically spend money to maximize their happiness, they 
occasionally seek out experiences that invoke sadness. The current research examines the 
consequences underlying this paradoxical phenomenon. Across five studies the current 
research demonstrates that sadness, but not negative mood, results in a motivation to 
connect with others. Subsequently, consumers are more likely to spend time with and 
money on other individuals. Further, this motivation to connect with others leads to the 
enjoyment of sad media and a greater sense of subjective well-being.  
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 Introduction 
 
“We can be afraid... or get angry, or feel pity, in general have pleasure or 
pain, both too much and too little, and in both ways not well; but [having 
these feelings] at the right times, about the right things, towards the right 
people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best 
condition, and proper to virtue.” 
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
 
“It seems that our entire psychical activity is bent upon procuring pleasure 
and avoiding pain, that it is automatically regulated by the Pleasure-
Principle.” 
- Freud, 1920/1952, p. 365 
 
The idea that we seek pleasure and avoid pain is one of the oldest in psychology (Freud 
1895/2003). Yet, consumers occasionally seek out experiences that invoke sadness. That 
individuals seek and enjoy sadness is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, tragedy has been 
one of the primary forms of entertainment since Ancient Greece. Romeo and Juliet, Gone 
with the Wind, and the movie Titanic are all heralded as classics, in spite of a focus on 
tragic events. More recently, Adele’s newest single ‘Hello’, a particularly sad song, broke 
a number of records, including the first single to sell more than one million downloads in 
the first week (Billboard.com, 2016). Despite this ubiquitous and paradoxical 
phenomenon, it is still unclear when and why we opt to consume sadness. Zillman (1985) 
summarizes this paradox eloquently: 
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“The appeal of tragedy challenges all hedonic considerations. The proper 
response to tragedy should be profound sadness. If this response is 
characteristically made (and there is no reason to suppose that it is not), why 
do people elect to put themselves through such a highly noxious experience?” 
(pp. 238-239). 
This paradox is made even more apparent when one considers that many brands 
invoke sadness (and subsequent happiness) in their advertising (e.g. Budweiser’s 
‘Lost Dog’ commercial that details a dog gone missing and the owner trying to find 
him), while research has demonstrated that such mixed emotions can lead to 
discomfort and less favorable brand and product attitudes (Williams & Aaker 2002; 
Hong & Lee 2010). Similarly, although research has demonstrated that sad news is 
the least likely to be shared (Berger and Milkman, 2014), sad advertisements 
typically top the most shared commercials from the super-bowl (Time, 2015).  
While recent research has begun to explore the motivation to consume sadness, there is 
little work that examines why individuals may derive enjoyment from consuming media, 
products, and experiences that produce sadness,. This paper addresses these limitations. 
Specifically, this paper explores the functional effects of sadness, demonstrating that 
sadness, but not other negative emotions, motivates individuals to affiliate with others, 
increases the desire to spend time and money on these affiliated others, and increases the 
enjoyment of sad media and sense of subjective well-being.  
 Why do we feel sadness? 
Functional theories of emotion suggest that the role of emotions is to allow people to 
respond adaptively to a specific event by modifying attention, motivation, and other 
mental processes (Levenson, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides 1990). For example, fear may 
lead to greater vigilance in uncertain situations. Thus, a related question that one might 
ask is why do we feel sadness at all? Although the function of sadness has been difficult 
to directly identify (Leary, Koch, & Hechenbleikner 2001), research on this topic has 
suggested that sadness can result from social loss or the failure to attain a goal (Gray, 
Ishii & Ambady, 2011; Carver 2006).  
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When individuals experience a social loss, sadness serves as a social signal to elicit 
sympathy (Bowlby 1981; Wolpert 2008) and to evoke compassion and greater helping 
behavior in others (Keltner & Kring 1998; Lazarus 1991; Gross & Levenson 1995; 
Hasson 2009). Sadness in infants serves as an attachment response triggered by 
separation and subsequently results in care from one’s parents (Bell & Ainsworth 1972; 
Bowlby 1969). Being away from one’s attachment figure, even briefly, can cause sadness 
in young infants, and the consistency in which a parent responds to this distress form the 
basis of an infant’s attachment security which continues into adulthood (Bowlby 1969).  
That early life experiences shape our adult behaviors has long been noted in the 
psychological literature. Williams, Huang and Bargh (2009) detail a process known as 
scaffolding, in which lower concrete bits of information in early infancy are mapped onto 
higher order, more abstract processes. While Williams et al. focus on the relationship 
between early experiences of physical warmth and learned social bonding, one could 
argue that the first association that infants ever learn is that feelings of sadness are 
associated with a caring response  from their parents. The idea that sadness corresponds 
with social bonding parallels the work from evolutionary psychology on crying. Charles 
Darwin initially contended that crying was purposeless and argued that “we must look at 
weeping as an incidental result, as purposeless as the secretion of tears from a blow 
outside the eye, or as a sneeze from the retina being affected by a bright light” (Darwin, 
1872, p. 175). Extant research challenges this view, suggesting that not only is crying 
(defined as tearful sobbing) a uniquely human trait, but that tears provide a reliable cue of 
sadness that results in greater perceived need for social support (Balsters et al., 2013). For 
example, edited pictures of crying individuals whose tears were digitally removed were 
rated as far less sad than unedited images, with raters reporting that those in the edited 
images required less social support (Provine, Krosnowski & Brocato, 2009; Balsters et 
al., 2013). Other research (Hasson 2009; Dissanayake 2008) has argued that crying 
promotes social bonding and can inhibit aggression in others. Taken together, these 
results suggest that sadness serves to elicit cognitive and behavioral responses that 
motivate individuals to affiliate with others.  
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 Utility from Sadness 
The idea that people are motivated to approach pleasure and avoid pain has a long 
history, dating back to the ancient Greeks and being one of basic motivational 
assumptions in psychology and marketing (Higgins 1997). This view, however, has been 
argued to be overly simplistic. Indeed, philosophers have noted that utility is more than 
just about pleasure and pain, but that it also encompasses ‘higher pleasures’ such as 
wisdom, values, reason, and morality (Mill, 1864; Aristotle, 1097b22–1098a20). Mill 
(1864) suggested that one cannot simply look at activities that bring the most pleasure, 
noting that "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different 
opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question” (p. 260). More 
recently, Chater and Loewenstein (2016) argued that our current views on utility fail to 
explain much of our behavior, such as the amount of time and money that we spend on 
making sense of our lives.  
Similarly, although it has typically been assumed that an increase in negative affect leads 
to a decrease in positive affect, recent research has demonstrated that positive and 
negative affect can occur simultaneously (Andrade & Cohen, 2007; Lau-Gesk 2005).  For 
example, Andrade and Cohen (2007) examined the consumption of fearful stimuli and 
demonstrated that consumption of fear was not simply the product of arousal seeking 
(e.g. appraising the fearful stimuli as positive) or relief seeking (e.g. seeking relief 
following a fearful experience).  Rather, some consumers appear to be able to detach 
themselves from the fear, and subsequently tended to experience positive feelings, while 
still experiencing the fear.  Although these researchers note that this does not explain why 
the fearful stimuli leads to positive affect or what individual differences lead consumers 
to seek out fear in the first place, it does provide evidence that positive and negative 
emotions can co-occur. 
In addition, research on well-being has demonstrated that factors like self-esteem, 
optimism, and positive affect are important elements for human flourishing (Diener et al., 
1999), other scholars have argued that a personal pursuit of happiness that is exemplified 
in Western culture, particularly in the United States, is not the only way to achieve this 
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goal (Myers 1992; Kitayama & Markus 2000). In many other cultures, for example Japan 
(Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2010), happiness is derived from a focus on sympathy 
for and connecting with others. Thus, to ‘be well’ “requires an attunement between the 
self and the social relations that are organized and maintained by the cultural practices 
and meanings of a community” (Kitayama & Markus 2000, p.114). Despite a 
considerable amount of research that has focused on happiness, the fundamental concept 
of these ideas has been relatively abstract (Oishi, Graham, Kesebir & Galinha, 2013). 
What leads to happiness seems to differ between cultures; subsequently, other researchers 
have argued that the term subjective well-being be used for this reason (Wierzbicka 2004; 
Pflug 2009; Oishi 2006; Diener 1984).  
Importantly, the quality of an individual’s social relationships is one of the most 
important factors in predicting well-being. Subsequently, behavior that increases social 
bonds (e.g. prosocial spending) increases the wellbeing in adults and children (Hoffman 
et al., 2014) and this effect appears to occur cross-culturally (Aknin et al., 2013; Aknin et 
al., 2012). Further, consumers buying gifts for others tend to be happier than when they 
buy gifts for themselves (Dunn, Aknin & Norton 2008). Importantly, the brain areas 
involved in empathy, which are vital in building social relationships, are highly related to 
those involved with sadness (Eisenberg 2012); individuals watching others in pain or 
those who are sad, show activation in the anterior insula and anterior medial cingulate 
cortex, the same areas that are activated with experiencing pain or sadness themselves 
(Eisenberg 2012). Thus, sadness should serve as an important facilitator for motivating a 
desire to affiliate, building social connections, and subsequently improving well-being.  
 Alternative Explanations 
Negative mood 
Although the primary hypothesis of this research is that sadness leads individuals to 
connect with others, a possible alternative explanation is that the effect may be driven by 
negative mood and thus the motivation to improve one’s mood. However, the evidence 
examining the link between affect and social connection is mixed, with some research 
noting that people are willing to affiliate, trust, and help more when in a positive mood 
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(Forgas & George, 2001; Baron 1997), while other research has suggested that 
individuals attempt to alleviate their negative mood by helping others (Cialdini et al., 
1987) or by greater spending in general (Cryder, Lerner, Gross & Dahl, 2008). Thus, in 
the following studies specifically test this alternative explanation in order to rule out 
negative mood and demonstrate the unique effect of sadness.  
Empathy 
Empathy refers to the ability to understand, experience, and be sensitive to the 
mental states of others (Hodges & Klein, 2001; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) and can 
take the form of cognitive perspective taking, compassionate empathic concern, or 
emotional empathy. Individuals can empathize with others’ sadness but also their 
anger or happiness. Indeed, recent research has demonstrated that empathy of 
others’ positive emotions can lead to greater social connection (Morelli et al., 
2015). Similarly, other research has argued that empathy results in greater oxytocin 
levels, which is associated with greater bonding, attachment, and pro-social 
behaviors (Barraza & Zak 2009; Barazza et al., 2015). Thus, while empathy should 
be positively related to social connection, the following studies explore the unique 
effect of sadness above and beyond any effects of empathy.  
 Enjoyment of Sadness 
While it is unclear exactly when and why individuals desire to consume sadness, 
researchers have begun examining some possibilities. Six explanations have been 
suggested: meta-emotions and norm compatibility (Mayer & Gaschke 1988; Jager & 
Bartsch 2006), Eudaimonia (Oliver 2008), downward social comparison (Knobloch, 
Weisbach, and Zillmann 2004 Knobloch-Westerwick et al, 2012), hedonic contrast 
(Novemsky & Ratner 2003), catharsis (Van Den Tol & Edwards, 2011), and social 
connection and empathy (Hoffner & Cantor, 1991; Tannenbaum & Gaer, 1965; Zillmann, 
1991). These theories and related findings are discussed in the following section. 
Norm compatibility and Meta-Emotions 
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Meta-emotions occur when an individual appraises his or her own emotions and through 
regulatory processes, comes to evaluate and change it (Mayer & Gaschke 1988; Jager & 
Bartsch 2006; Oliver 1993; Hofer & Wirth 2012). That is, when consumers experience 
sadness, they may cognitively evaluate these emotions and re-appraise them as positive. 
Consumers tend to differ on their ability to reflect and appraise these emotions. These 
differences are argued to be a function of whether consumers see them as acceptable or 
normative, and are moderated by individual differences in emotion regulation self-
efficacy (Mayer & Gaschke 1988; Hofer & Wirth 2012). 
Subsequent research has provided some evidence to how normative difference can 
explain why consumers enjoy sadness. Hofer & Wirth (2012) demonstrated that 
enjoyment of sad films was mediated primarily by norm compatibility (e.g. “my feelings 
were appropriate with regard to the film”). Specifically, individuals found sadness to be 
enjoyable when they interpreted their emotions as normatively correct. For example, one 
may feel more comfortable after feeling sad while witnessing the pain or death of a 
movie’s protagonist.  
Like other emotions, sadness becomes socially labeled and subsequently may be 
subjectively interpreted, suppressed or modified (Thoits 1989; Oatley & Jenkins 1992). 
Thoits (1989) makes the argument that even if emotions are physiologically grounded, 
the subjective experience of an emotion is influenced by our cultural beliefs about them. 
When individuals become conscious of their emotions, they function as explanations to 
ourselves and to others. Violations of standard emotional norms may lead to negative 
affect. For example, after the death of a close loved one, happiness may be more aversive 
than feeling sad. However, that individuals can re-appraise sad emotions does not provide 
an explanation for why individuals seek them out in the first place. 
Eudaimonia   
Another related factor that may lead to enjoyment due to sadness is that individuals tend 
to draw greater insight and engage in self-reflection about life (Oliver 2008; Wirth, 
Hofer, & Schramm, 2012). Although a considerable amount of work on well-being 
focuses on a hedonic approach - attaining pleasure and avoiding pain - individuals can 
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also increase their well-being through a eudaimonic approach, which emphasizes 
meaning and self-realization (Ryan & Deci 2001; Waterman 1993). Dating back to 
Aristotle, philosophers have argued that true happiness can be found in the expression of 
virtue rather than the mere pursuit of pleasure. Indeed, researchers have argued that 
subjective well-being which focuses on life-satisfaction, positive mood and the absence 
of negative mood is fundamentally distinct from psychological well-being which focuses 
on autonomy, personal growth, self-acceptance, life purpose, mastery, and positive 
relatedness (Ryff & Keyes 1995; Ryff & Singer 2000; Ryan & Deci 2000). 
In line with this reasoning, Oliver (2008) argued that individuals in ‘tender’ affective 
states (feelings of sympathy, kindness, etc.) tend to enjoy more dramatic movies that 
invoke sadness, tenderness, and romance. The author argues that these states lead to 
eudaimonic motivations, in which consumers sought greater meaningfulness and self-
reflection. However, these conclusions do not necessarily follow from the data. Rather, 
the author simply suggests that these tender states may subsequently lead viewers to 
reflect on life and this hypothesis is not specifically tested.  
Downward Social Comparison  
A third argument for the consumption of sadness has been through downward social 
comparison. A number of studies have now looked at the concept of Schadenfreude, in 
which pleasure is the consequence from the misfortune of others (Smith et al., 2009). 
Although the idea that others’ hardships produces pleasure may be unsettling, a number 
of empirical studies have demonstrated that we feel good when others fail. For example, 
when fans of the Red Sox see the Yankees lose they experience similar pleasure as when 
the Red Sox win (Cikara, Botvinick & Fiske, 2011; Hareli & Weiner 2002).  
Much of this work argues that this positive affect is a function of social comparison. The 
understanding of our self is largely defined by how we compare to others (Festinger 
1954). When we learn that we performed better than others, we tend to feel better about 
ourselves. Consequently, learning that others have done worse leads to the same 
outcome. Indeed, when we observe the misfortunes of others, we tend to feel better about 
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ourselves. Further, the lower one’s self-esteem, the more pleasure one gains from seeing 
someone else fail (Dijk et al., 2009).  
In line with these ideas, Knobloch and colleagues (Knobloch, Weisbach, and Zillmann 
2004; Knobloch-Westerwick et al, 2012) demonstrated that sadness leads to greater 
enjoyment as a function of both greater self-focused and other-focused thoughts. 
Following the viewing of a shortened version of the movie Atonement (2007), those 
participants who felt greater sadness reflected more on their life and their relationships 
with others, which in turn resulted in greater enjoyment.  
Hedonic Contrast 
One of the views that has appeared in the marketing literature is hedonic contrast: an 
expectation to enjoy a positive experience following a negative one (Novemsky & Ratner 
2003; Kahneman 1994). Some of this work has examined contrast effects with regards to 
variety seeking, demonstrating that individuals predict that the same experience will 
become less enjoyable, whereas, it in fact became more enjoyable (Kahneman & Snell 
1992). Other research has found that consumers expect to enjoy positive experiences 
more after a negative experience. However, while consumers may have this lay theory, 
they tend to not experience any greater positivity after a negative experience (Novemsky 
& Ratner 2003).  
Although hedonic contrast effects are related to the consumption of sadness, the current 
research is particularly concerned with consumption of sadness for its own sake. 
Research on hedonic contrasts has operationalized these consumption experiences by 
examining both positive and negative experiences (e.g. eating a disliked jelly bean and 
subsequently eating a liked jelly bean); whereas the current research is primarily 
concerned with the consumption of only the negative experience of sadness. 
Catharsis 
When individuals experience sadness, people can choose to suppress these emotions, re-
appraise them, or express them (Gross & John 2003). The evidence for whether 
suppression or expression of emotions is beneficial is mixed. Some research has found 
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that suppressing the feeling or expression of negative emotions like sadness does not 
alleviate the feeling but may actually increase the experience and the associated 
physiological response (Gross 1998), whereas suppressing the expression of positive 
emotion does eliminate positive feelings (Gross and Levenson 1997). On the other hand, 
research exploring the expression of anger (e.g. by hitting a punching bag) has 
demonstrated that it may increase aggressive tendencies (Bushman 2002; Bushman, 
Baumeister & Stack 1999).  
Similarly, recent research has argued that when individuals feel sad they may seek out 
sad music for cathartic self-regulatory reasons (Van Den Tol & Edwards, 2011). 
Research examining crying has argued that crying serves to restore both psychological 
and physiological homeostasis when distressed and that regulating one’s tears could 
result in mental distress (Cornelius, 2001 Vingerhoets, 2013; Vingerhoets, Bylsma, and 
Rottenberg, 2009; Vingerhoets & Byslsma 2015). Lay theories suggest that people feel 
better after crying and 94% of popular articles recommended crying to release 
psychological tension (Cornelius 1986), although typically only 60-70% of individuals 
agree with this sentiment (Bylsma, Vingerhoets, & Rottenberg 2008). Indeed, in 
laboratory settings, individuals tend to feel worse after being made to cry (Rottenberg, 
Gross, Wilhelm, Najmi, & Gotlib 2002), although this is moderated by whether 
individuals receive social support (Bylsma, Vingerhoets, & Rottenberg 2008).  
 Social Connection  
The final reason individuals may feel positive affect from consuming sadness is because 
sad media may provide a feeling of social bonding with others. Despite little research 
focused on this idea, there is literature that is consistent with it. For example, individuals 
with a greater ability to engage in perspective taking tend to report more sadness while 
watching a sad movie (Hoffner & Cantor, 1991; Tannenbaum & Gaer, 1965; Zillmann, 
1991) Similarly, research has consistently shown a gender effect in which women enjoy 
sad movies more than men (Oliver 2008; 1993;) and also that women tend to show higher 
levels of empathy, which is instrumental in forming social bonds (Bimbaum, Nosanchuk, 
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& Croll, 1980; Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkantz, 1972; Barazza 
& Zak 2009).  
However, many of the themes discussed above are also interpretable within this social 
connection view. For example, research on eudaimonia argued that a feeling of greater 
enjoyment when a person is sad occurs when he or she is manipulated to feel more 
sympathetic and kind towards other individuals (Oliver 2008). Similarly, sadness is 
typically normative in social loss situations such as a funeral and cross-cultural research 
on mourning suggests it helps to build stronger social bonds (Balk, 1997; Rosenblatt & 
Elde 1990; Hayden 1987). Finally, the research on catharsis is more explicit with its 
relation to social connection, demonstrating that crying leads to positive outcomes, only 
when it is moderated by social support. Taken together, although consumers may enjoy 
sadness for a variety of reasons, each of these reasons is qualified by greater social 
connection.  
 The current research  
The current research seeks to understand the functional consequences underlying sad 
consumption and the subsequent utility it provides. First, it seeks to systematically 
explore and examine the reasons and motivations for why individuals derive enjoyment 
from sadness. It is hypothesized that the primary benefit underlying sadness consumption 
is social-connection. Second, it examines the subsequent effects of sadness as a result of 
this greater social connection. Specifically, consumers should seek out products and 
experiences that facilitate this goal. Finally, as a result of this greater social connection, 
consumers will enjoy sad media and feel a greater sense of subjective well-being. Taken 
together, the current research suggests that sadness consumption provides a motivation 
for greater affiliation that can serve to foster social bonding and deeper social 
connections. 
 Study 1: Open Ended Qualitative Questionnaire 
The goal of the study 1 was to explore, qualitatively, reasons that people had for 
consuming sadness. Specifically, study 1 sought to examine to what extent individuals 
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report the motivations and explanations reviewed above, while also providing an 
opportunity to discover new consumption specific explanations. While evidence of many 
of these mechanisms were found, social connection emerged as a predominant theme 
across the participants.  
Method  
100 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were asked 
open-ended questions regarding when and why they feel sad. Specifically, two questions 
were asked: “Please tell us about times in your life that you wanted to be sad?” and “Do 
you think there are specific times in people’s lives that they are more or less likely to use 
products or chose to have experiences that make them feel sad? Please explain”. The 
findings were organized into general themes and subsequently interpreted to reflect the 
underlying base motivations.  
Specifically, this initial phase began with a hermeneutic idiographic analysis of the 
responses (Mick and Buhl 1992; Thompson, Pollio and Locander 1994) in which 
common and recurrent themes were identified. Two researchers examined the responses, 
both individually and collectively, for common meanings and interpretations. The 
psychological mechanisms (e.g. catharsis) reviewed above provided a theoretical starting 
point and many themes paralleled those in the literature. However, examining these 
responses more holistically provided the opportunity to uncover novel explanations. 
Results 
Some participants were adamant in opposing the experience of sadness. These 
participants seemingly lacked the ability to even conceive of why someone would 
consume sadness, suggesting that sadness is always a negative experience and an emotion 
to be avoided at all times. For example, some participants wrote: 
“I really never want to be sad. I hate the feeling of sadness, it is nothing but 
helplessness. You can't do anything when you are sad. You just have to accept the 
consequence and live with it. It is horrible.” 
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“I never want to be sad. Who wants to be sad?” 
“This is a ridiculous question as I am emotionally healthy, and do not attempt to 
bring negativity down on myself. Even if I am watching poor starving Africans; it is 
on me to not allow myself to be emotionally manipulated. 
“This question is completely unintelligible to me. Want to be sad? I have no 
answer. I have drowned in my sorrows. Felt sorry for myself. But I did not want to 
be sad. I have no answer for this. I am trying to think of something....do people do 
this? Is tis [sic] a Canadian thing...I was sad when my uncle died a few months 
ago. Sad is the expected reaction, and I certainty felt it. If I was not sad, it would 
bother me, so in that case I guess I wanted (expected) to be sad. Everyone was 
sad.” 
As the last participant alluded, If I was not sad, it would bother me, so in that case I guess 
I wanted (expected) to be sad. Everyone was sad.” while some participants’ initial 
intuitions were to question the idea that one might want to be sad, many other participants 
did purport the occasional motivation to consume sadness. Participants provided a 
number of reasons, which generally echoed the literature. Specifically, participants 
provided normative/meta reasons, eudemonic, and cathartic reasons, however there was 
no discussion of downward social comparison or hedonic contrast. In addition, the theme 
of nostalgia was also evident from their responses.  
However, a major meta-theme that arose was sadness in relation to social connection. 
That is, when participants discussed their normative, eudemonic, cathartic, or nostalgic 
reasons, they did so in terms that are interpretable as seeking connections with others. 
That is the normative, eudemonic, cathartic, and nostalgic reasons focused on sadness 
related to people and not sadness due to other possible sad events (e.g. favorite sports 
team losing). In addition, many participants mentioned that sadness was consumed 
explicitly to assist with social connection and a greater connection with humanity in 
general. In the following sections I expand on each of these ideas.  
Nostalgia 
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As noted, nostalgia was the only major theme that was not discussed in the previous 
literature with relation to the motivation and enjoyment of sadness. The link between 
nostalgia and sadness is ambiguous. Some research (Wildschut et al., 2006; Zhou et al., 
2012) demonstrated that individuals recalling nostalgia events reported more positive, but 
not more negative affect. However, other research has argued that nostalgia results in a 
mix of both with individuals reporting both happiness and sadness when recalling 
nostalgic events (Hepper et al., 2011). Importantly, nostalgia has also been shown to 
strengthen social connections (Wildschut et al, 2006; Wildschut et al. 2010), further 
strengthening the link between sadness and the motivation to connect with others. Within 
the marketing literature, researchers have noted that possessions help others establish and 
maintain a sense of their past (Belk 1990; 1991). Belk (1990) notes that nostalgia is 
typically tied to sadness and longing and typically involves emotional memory processes. 
These ideas are similarly exemplified by some of the participants. Specifically, 
participants noted that the sadness associated with certain products and experiences 
served to remind them and connect them with others and a connection with their past. For 
example, one participant discussed how a candy helped remind and connect him or her 
with their grandmother while another participant mentioned that he or she picks a 
particular flavor of ice-cream because it makes them feel connected with a friend. 
“I buy the hard candy referred to as cinnamon discs at least once a week. I 
purchase them only because when I was a kid I lived with my grandma and 
we had these everyday. They make me feel sad because it is the only thing I 
can really remember from my childhood that connects me to my grandmother. 
She is no longer around these days.” 
“One such example that comes to mind is attending a favorite restaurant of 
my Mother's. It was her favorite place to go for a treat, and when I go there, I 
always feel sad, again nostalgia, thinking about her and how this place made 
her happy. Now this also applies to her favorite pizza, favorite song, and even 
favorite soda. Whenever I think of any of those things, or experience them, I 
feel sad.” 
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“Occasionally, I will look at photos of my past and these will make me feel 
sad as they bring back memories that are sad.” 
Buying bagels always makes me sad because I used to get a bagel with my 
mother every Tuesday, and now we live too far away to do it together 
anymore. I still like bagels, but buying them makes me think about what I am 
missing and it's a little sad.” 
 “Whenever I take a ice cream I take a particular flavor to remembering my 
friend, I feel sad every time and have the ice cream as my friend is sitting in 
front of me.” 
Normative and meta-emotions  
As noted, when consumers experience sadness, they may cognitively evaluate these 
emotions and re-appraise them as positive. However, this explanation does not indicate 
under what situations consumers are more likely to do so. Results indicated that 
participants were explicit that they used sadness for functional purposes in helping them 
empathize and connect with others. For example, one participant suggested that sadness 
helped him or her connect with characters in a story, while another participant was 
explicit about sadness helping him or her feel connected to their grandfather who passed 
away. 
 “The only instance where I think I would desire being sad is those more 
harmless, insignificant types of sadness that come from watching an 
interesting but sad film or moment in television or in a book. For those 
moments you want to be able to feel sad for the characters and the situation, 
to better immerse yourself in the story and think about what's going on.” 
“Definitely after a tragedy, like a searing break-up or the death of a loved-
one. Those are times when you want to read sad stories (like the more moving 
parts of Game of Thrones) or listen to sad music (like practically anything by 
Adele). It just helps to feel someone who knows your sadness emotionally, 
and conveys it with a beauty that makes it grandiose.” 
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“Times in my life when I want to be sad are when loved ones pass away. If 
you weren't sad about that, then they probably didn't mean much to you. So in 
that case, i would hope that I'm very sad when that occurs, a very long time 
from now.” 
“When I am in a situation where I feel sad I want to feel it because its ok to 
feel an emotion that is negative. Then I can deal with what I am sad bout and 
get help and comfort from others”. 
“There are few times in my life that I want to be sad. I was sad when my 
grandfather passed away and felt that giving into my feelings was probably 
the best way to connect. Usually I try to power through negative feelings. 
However, at that time, I thought that sadness was the appropriate response.” 
Catharsis 
Cathartic reasons also touched on social connection. Although some participants 
focused only on ‘expelling’ the sadness, other participants specifically noted that 
this process allows one to better cherish and appreciate family and friends. For 
example, one participant mentioned that sadness assisted with the grieving process 
resulting in better memories of a person while another participants was more 
explicit in that catharsis resulted in bonding.  
 “I tend to bottle up my emotions, until they come bursting out of me. From 
time to time I like to watch sad movies or listen to sad songs, in order to help 
keep my emotions in check.” 
“That's a tough one. I guess I would want to be sad when a loved one passes, 
because sadness is part of the grieving process, and I would like to get that 
out of the way and out of my system so I could get back to living a normal 
life, with good memories of that person.” 
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“you purchase a sad movie or listen to sad music to bring those upsetting 
feelings that can linger deep in the psyche, without getting rid of some of 
these feelings, a person can lose their mind.” 
“Sad songs, sad movies where people die. I purchase and use them because it 
is good to cry and they make me feel better after I cry. I love to watch 
touching movies that make me feel sad. It makes me think about life and to 
cherish the moments you have her on earth with your family and friends.” 
“Yes. People are more sad at times than others. They seek release through 
catharsis. If your lover just died, you get relief by bonding with people or art 
items that have the same emotions or evoke the same emotions that you felt.” 
Eudaimonia  
Sadness, to some participants, reflected an important part of the human experience. 
Rather than being an unpleasant affective state that these participants wanted to 
reject or diminish, sad experiences were associated with a greater connection to 
humanity in general. For example, participants discussed how they will watch a sad 
movie to help connect with their own humanity  
“About once a year I will intentionally watch a sad movie just to keep myself 
human. …When I watch a sad movie, it is best if I do it with someone I love, 
that way I don't sli [sic] into the abyss alone for who knows how long.” 
“I want to be sad when something sad happens. For instance, if I experience 
a death of a friend or family member, I want to be sad. Sadness is a part of 
humanity; I do not want to be merely numb during such times.” 
“I have had that experience in movies. Again, sadness is a part of life and 
something that one may occasionally want to experience. I went in to the 
movie watching experience understanding it would be sad. I knew it was a 
great movie though and worth the sad experience and I knew the sadness 
would allow me to be in better touch with my humanity and with others.”  
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Social Connection 
The majority of the responses focused directly with social connection. Although 
this social connection ranged from facilitating a connection with others, to an 
appeal for greater connection, and a more generalized connection with life, 
humanity and the struggles of others. Relatedly, participants noted that sadness 
helped them empathize which facilitated this connection with others. Sad 
consumption was occasionally linked to consuming products or experiences that 
reminded them of others. However, many other responses suggested that the 
motivation to be sad was interconnected with the desire to connect with other 
individuals. Sadness tended to allow people to better understand and appreciate 
others’ points of view, particularly when those points of view were sad 
themselves.  
“A famous animator/director, Monty Oum, passed away 1 years ago. He was 
the creator of the popular web based show, RWBY. I am a big fan of the show 
and also a fan of Mr. Oum. When he passed away suddenly in 2015 I was 
shocked. I didn't know him personally ut [sic] I still felt the loss. I knew he 
was gone from my life forever. So I put on some music and spent some alone 
time thinking about him and what he meant to me. I wanted to mourn him in 
my own little way.” 
“Yes. When i am already sad, or at times when i am feeling little to nothing. 
In a way, they allow me to re connect with my feelings during those times. 
They’re invigorate empathy, compassion and caring by doing so.” 
 “I want to be sad when I see other people suffering because I want to 
empathize with them and understand their situation. I also feel motivated to 
help when I feel sad about someone's loss or a situation someone is in makes 
me feel sad. I think it can lead to something positive because it makes me 
want to do something to help the person and make things better.  
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“I rarely want to be sad. Sometimes I think about a past relationship and I 
put on some sad music and just think about it.” 
Epiphenomena  
The last category of responses is classified as epiphenomena – an outcome of the 
consumption but not a necessary driver. Rather than being motivated to consume the 
sadness, these participants noted that the sadness stemmed from the consumption and that 
it subsequently was aversive. For example, some participants noted that some of their 
addictive behaviors would lead them to sadness and regret.  
“I purchase chewing tobacco, it makes me sad that I am a nicotine addict, but 
I hate the withdrawals that happen if I do not buy it...” 
“I feel sad when I eat all my potato chips. I generally want more afterwards.” 
“I take some medicines that make me feel sad. I feel sad because they remind 
me of my mortality and that I probably won't get to see my kids grow up.” 
“Cigarette's make me feel sad. I purchase them every day even though they 
are super harmful for me. I cough a lot and have trouble breathing but just 
can't seem to quit. Whenever I go purchase a pack I feel sad knowing that I 
am just hurting myself even further.” 
These responses tended to reflect addictive consumption patterns. While consuming 
products that make one feel sad and negative are an interesting avenue for future 
research, this project is focused primarily on when and why consumers are motivated and 
enjoy the consumption of sadness. 
Discussion 
The results of the study indicate a strong instrumental function of sadness for social 
connection. Specifically, most of the responses tended to coincide with a desire to 
affiliate and connect with others. For example, responses that were associated with a 
nostalgia theme all represented memories of other people. If nostalgia by itself produced 
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sadness then one could expect references to products or experiences associated with 
solely with one’s past, such as backpacking through Europe or a song from one’s youth. 
However, sadness related to nostalgia tended to focus on one’s connection with loved 
ones.  
Similarly, many of the themes were explicitly focused on sadness being related to the 
connection with others, whether that connection be to a specific individual or to a greater 
connection with life. Even normative responses about sadness corresponded with 
empathy for others and not with other causes of sadness, such as losing a job. Individuals 
explicitly noted that sadness served as a catalyst to help with social connection and that 
the motivation to be sad or consume sadness was tied to this goal of connectedness. 
Catharsis was the only theme that did not always reflect a connection with others. While 
some respondents noted that catharsis facilitated social connection, other respondents 
tended to note that sadness was good for its own sake. However, the research on catharsis 
and sadness is mixed, with an important moderator being social support. Indeed, Bylsma 
and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that comforting, understanding, and friendliness 
were associated with positive mental improvement following a crying episode, while 
anger or being ignored were negatively related.  
Taken together, the results of this study suggest that sadness serves an instrumental 
purpose to help individuals connect with others to achieve a more positive subjective 
well-being. In the following studies, I explore these ideas experimentally.  
 Study 2 
The first goal of study 2 was to provide initial experimental evidence that the emotion of 
sadness motivates individuals to connect with others. However, as noted, one potential 
alternative explanation is that this effect on social connection may be a product of 
negative mood in general. Specifically, participants may simply be seeking to improve a 
negative mood and be seeking social connection as a result. Indeed, other negative 
emotions, such as fear, seem to have similar effects (e.g. Dunn & Hoegg, 2014). Other 
research exploring sadness has argued that the motivation to help others is a result of 
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participants trying to dispel their negative mood state (Manucia, Baumann & Cialdini, 
1984). Thus, study 2 was designed to examine whether sadness resulted in greater social 
connection over and above other emotions. 
The second goal of study 2 was to explore the effect of sadness on greater social 
connection. However, two different effects are possible. The first is that sadness provides 
a motivation for greater social connection. The second is that sadness makes people feel 
more socially connected. The first is informed by the evidence that sadness results in 
behavioral tendencies that strengthen social bonds, such as witnessing crying resulting in 
a greater perceived need for support (Balsters et al., 2013; Gray, Ishii & Ambady, 2011). 
Recent research has examined why people are motivated to be angry (Tamir, Mitchell & 
Gross 2008; Tamir 2009; Carver & Harmon-Jones 2009). These authors suggest that 
individuals prefer activities that encourage anger when they were anticipating 
confrontation and regaining lost ground (Tamir, Mitchell & Gross 2008). However, 
whereas anger signals that action is needed, sadness signals that support is needed. Thus, 
sadness may provide the impetus for an individual to seek out greater social connection 
and through this motivation the experience greater enjoyment and subjective well-being. 
However, the latter interpretation suggests that strong associations developed between 
sadness and social connection result in the scaffolding of the sadness emotion with the 
feeling of greater social connection, such as how warmth and cold becomes associated 
with social inclusion and exclusion (Williams, Huang & Bargh, 2009, Ijzerman et al., 
2014). That is, when individuals feel sad, they actually feel more socially connected. 
Indeed, some individuals tend to report that they feel better when they cry (Cornelius 
1986; Bylsma, Vingerhoets, & Rottenberg 2008) and this may be due to the fact that 
sadness leads one to feel connected with others. Further, some of the participants in study 
1 noted that sadness helped them feel more connected (e.g. “Sometimes I think about a 
past relationship and I put on some sad music and just think about it”). Thus, under this 
interpretation greater feelings of sadness may correspond to the actual feeling of greater 
social connection.  
Method 
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270 Participants were recruited via the University’s Behavioral Lab. Twenty-four 
participants failed the attention check, leaving a total of 246 (55% Female, Mage = 18.58) 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of ten movie clips (see Appendix), which 
corresponded with one of five emotions (Sad, Anger, Joy, Disgust, and Fear), which were 
utilized to control and compare emotional effects. Each video was a movie clip 
(approximately 5 minutes), taken from the database of emotion-eliciting films (Schaefer, 
Nils, Sanchez & Phillipot, 2010). The two movies corresponding with each emotion-type 
were aggregated.  
Participants first watched a movie clip and then were asked to rate the extent to which 
they felt a number of emotions (e.g. “Please indicate whether you currently feel the 
following emotions” 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree), which included the five 
emotions relating to the particular video (sad, anger, fear, joy, and disgust). To rule out 
that the effects were being driven by other emotions or by negative mood in general, 
other secondary emotions (shame, surprise, etc.) were included (Allen, Machleit, & 
Marine, 1988). Next, participants completed the Social Connectedness scale (e.g. “I feel 
disconnected from the world around me.” 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree, α = 
.94; Lee & Robbins, 1995), the Perceived Social Support scale, which contains subscales 
relating to a close significant other, family, and a friend (Zimet, Dahlem, ZImet, & 
Farley; 1988; e.g. “There is a special person who is around when I am in need, 1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree, α = .90), and the Desire to Affiliate with Others 
scale (Park & Maner, 2009; e.g. “Right now how much would you like to talk on the 
phone with a friend” 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much, α = .81). The first two scales 
corresponded with a current sense of social connection, while the latter scale 
corresponded with a motivation to connect with others.  
Results 
Effect of Videos on Sadness. Overall, examining sadness videos (M = 5.38, SD = 1.24), 
versus all the other videos combined (M = 3.98, SD = 1.90), revealed a significant effect 
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t(122.76) = 8.07, p < .001, equal variances not assumed, Levene’s test = 34.60, p < .001.1 
In addition, a Univariate ANOVA examining the five emotion-videos on level of sadness 
was conducted. The results indicated a significant main effect F(1,322) = 30.74, p < .001. 
However, pairwise comparisons revealed that although the reported level of sadness on 
the Sadness videos (M = 5.38, SD = 1.24) differed from Fear (M = 3.09, SD = 1.94), Joy 
(M = 2.94, SD = 1.71) and Disgust (M = 3.42, SD = 1.65) videos (all ps < .001), it did 
not differ from Anger (M = 5.38, SD = 1.18) p = .98. All other emotion videos were 
significantly higher on their specific emotion with the exception of disgust (M = 5.96, SD 
= 1.26) compared to the fear videos (M = 5.83, SD = 1.40), p = .67. Table 8 provides a 
summary of descriptive statistics of each emotion on video condition. As Table 8 
demonstrates, the videos did not uniquely and cleanly elicit specific emotional states and 
there was considerable overlap of the emotions between videos (see Table 9 for 
correlations between emotions). Subsequently, for this study, I focused on the subjective 
experience of the participants’ emotions.  
Primary Analyses. A structural equation model was computed to examine the unique 
effects that each emotion of the five video emotions (sad, joy, fear, anger, and disgust) 
had on the various scales (see figure 5). Specifically, each of the dependent variables 
were regressed on a single continuous variable of each of the five emotions. Results 
revealed that sadness was a unique predictor on desire to affiliate β = .19, p <.001. In 
addition, anger was a negative predictor on desire to affiliate β = -.18, p = .004 and 
disgust marginally predicted desire to affiliate β = .08, p = .09. Neither Joy β = -.03, p = 
.43, nor fear β = .04, p = .39 were predictive. To determine whether the effect of joy and 
its negative relationship with sadness was biasing the results, the same analysis removing 
joy was conducted. Removing joy from the model reveals the same effect with sadness as 
a significant predictor, β = .29, p = .001, while removing the joy condition similarly 
reveals sadness as a significant predictor, β = .26, p = .003.  
 
                                                 
1
 Assuming equal variances similarly reveals a significant effect t(244) = 5.92, p < .001. 
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Figure 5: Structural equation model from Study 2 
 
Note: The above analysis does not contain social-connectedness or the other perceived 
social support subscales. Only significant paths are shown 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Next, assessing the effect of the emotions on perceived social support, the effects 
demonstrate that sadness is a marginally significant predictor, β = .075, p = .08. 
Similarly, there was an effect for fear, β = .058, p = .08. There was no effect for joy, 
disgust or anger (all p’s > .26). It should be noted that the effect of sadness was driven by 
the subscale of a close special other, in which sadness positively predicted support β = 
.12, p = .006. Fear also was a positive predictor β = .08, p = .02, and anger negatively 
predicted β = -.11, p = .02. None of the emotions predicted support with family or friend 
(all p’s > .16). Removing joy from the model reveals the same effect with sadness as a 
significant predictor, β = .19, p = .03. Finally, we looked at the effect of sadness on 
general social connection. Sadness did not predict social connection β = .03, p = .53, 
although neither did any emotions (all p’s > .14). 
It should be noted that bivariate correlations also revealed that sadness predicted desire to 
affiliate, r = .19, p < .001 and perceived social support, r = .17, p = .002, but it did not 
predict social connectedness, r = .04. When desire to affiliate was regressed with all the 
emotions, sadness remained a positive predictor β = .30, p = .005 and predictive of 
perceived social support with a close other β = .25, p = .03, and overall perceived social 
support, β = .25, p = .03. Further, no other emotions significantly predicted desire to 
affiliate or perceived social support, with the exception of anger which was marginally 
negatively predictive, β = -.20, p = .07 and β = -.19, p = .10, respectively and anxious β = 
.15, p = .08, for desire to affiliate only. Taken together, the results suggest an important 
and unique effect of sadness on social connection that is not explained by any of the other 
emotions. See Table 10 for correlations and regression analyses for each emotion on the 
desire to affiliate, perceived social support, and social connection. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 provide initial evidence that sadness leads to a desire to connect 
with others. Individuals who felt greater sadness, subsequently felt a greater desire to 
affiliate and these effects remained even controlling for other emotions. The effect of 
conflation of emotions in each of the video clips or having close connections being more 
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accessible by the social connection scale questions. To address this, I conducted a post-
test exploring videos that strongly affected sadness vs. a more neutral control.  
A pretest (N = 100) determined the three movies that elicited the greatest amount of 
sadness, while minimally eliciting other emotions (see table 11), the opening scene from 
Up (Disney/Pixar, 2009), a 3D animation called Changing batteries (Sunny Side Up 
Productions, 2013) and a scene from the movie Click (Revolution Studies/Happy 
Madison 2006). The control videos varied between an educational video about Antarctica 
(CGP Grey, 2015), an action scene from Iron man (Marvel Studios, Paramount Pictures, 
2008) and a chase scene from Despicable Me (Universal Pictures, Illumination 
Entertainment, 2010). Links to the videos can be found in the appendix. 
120 participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (23 failed an attention 
check, leaving a total of 97, 55% female, Mage = 39.55) and watched one of the videos. 
Following, they completed the desire to affiliate scale and perceived social support 
scales. Results demonstrated that participants in the sad condition showed a greater desire 
to affiliate, (M = 4.14, SD = 1.43) compared to those in the control condition (M = 3.22, 
SD = 1.57), t(95) = 3.01, p =.003, while there was no effect on total perceived social 
support (M = 5.38, SD = 1.16 vs. M = 5.54, SD = 1.16) or the special person sub-factor 
(M = 5.77, SD = 1.27 vs. M = 5.70, SD = 1.43) p’s > .48. In addition, whereas the sad 
movies elicited greater sadness t(95) = 15.28, p < .001, they did not differ on the anger, 
disgust, or fear, all p’s > .47. Taken together, the results of study 1 and the post-test 
provide evidence that sadness leads to a motivation to affiliate, but not to a feeling of 
greater social support and connection. In the following studies, I explore the 
consequences of this increased motivation to affiliate. Specifically, I suggest that this 
motivation leads individuals to buy for others, enjoy the sad media, and have greater 
subjective well-being. Figure 6 provides a conceptual overview. 
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 Study 3 
Method 
215 Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 35 individuals failed the 
attention checks, leaving a total of 180 (44% Female, Mage = 34.86). Participants were 
assigned to either a sad clip condition or a control condition. As in study 2’s post-test, 
three movies were used for each condition to control for systematic differences in each 
video. Prior to watching the videos, participants completed the interpersonal reactivity 
index to measure individual differences in empathy, which contains 4 subscales, each 
with 7 questions, Perspective Taking (α = .83), Fantasy Scale (α = .88), Empathic 
Concern (α = .93) and Personal Distress (α = .89). Afterwards participants watched one 
of the movie clips.  
Following, participants completed a manipulation check assessing the specific emotional 
states (sad, anger, etc.), as well as overall arousal (Anderson, Anderson, & Deuser, 1996; 
Vigorous, Drowsy, 10 questions, α = .87). Participants then completed the desire to 
affiliate scale (5 questions, α = .92) and two dependent measures. The first dependent 
variable was a repeated measure, which assessed one’s willingness to buy something for 
themselves (e.g. I’d like to buy a gift for myself, 4 questions α = .81, see table 12 for 
items and loading) and one’s willingness to buy something for a close other (e.g. I’d like 
to buy a gift for a close friend, I’d like to eat a meal with a close friend, I’d like do 
something nice for a close friend, I’d like to play a game with a close friend  α = .88). 
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Figure 6:  Conceptual overview 
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If the desire to affiliate is the product of mood maintenance, one would expect an 
increase in both buying for oneself and buying for others. If, however, the desire to 
affiliate is a consequence of sadness, then one would only expect an increase only in the 
close other variable. The second measure assessed real world charitable contributions in 
which participants were able to donate part of their payment for the study (which was $1) 
to a charity (between $0 and $1). Previous research has demonstrated that prosocial 
giving helps facilitate emotional benefits when individuals desire communal relationships 
(Williamson & Clark 1989) and thus individuals with a greater desire to affiliate should 
donate more to charity.  Finally, basic demographics were gathered and participants were 
also asked if they had ever seen the clip they watched (Yes, No). Controlling for whether 
participants had seen the clip did not affect the results. 
Results 
Manipulation Check: A manipulation revealed that the three sadness movies did not 
differ in their level of sadness (p’s > .63), but all differed from the 3 control movies (all 
p’s <.001) and thus the movies were aggregated into their respective conditions. 
Assessing the difference between the aggregated sad condition (M = 5.29, SD = 1.74) and 
the aggregated control condition (M = 1.75, SD = 1.12) reveals a significant effect on 
sadness, t(163.98) = 16.43 p < .001, equal variances not assumed (Levene’s test F(1,178) 
= 10.39. p = .002).  
Assessing differences between conditions on other emotions, there was a marginal effect 
of condition on fear (M = 2.43, SD = 1.85 vs M = 1.95, SD = 1.48, equal variances not 
assumed), t(176.62) p = .06, an expected negative effect on joy (M = 3.33, SD = 1.94 vs 
M = 3.93, SD = 1.86), t(178) = -2.10, p = .04, and a significant and negative effect on 
arousal (M = 4.80, SD = 1.03 vs. 5.33, SD = 1.10) t(178) = -3.35, p = .001. There were 
no other differences on the other emotions.  
Primary Analysis. First, the effect of condition on desire to affiliate was assessed. The 
analysis revealed that those in the sadness condition showed greater desire to affiliate (M 
= 3.87, SD = 1.77) compared to those in the control condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.42), 
t(176.86) = 2.82, p = .005, equal variances not assumed (Levene’s test F(1,178) = 6.42, p 
109 
 
 
= .01). This effect remains when controlling for the other emotions, as well as arousal, 
F(1,166) = 7.08, p = .009. Similarly, sadness predicted desire to affiliate r = .28, p < .001, 
and a regression of all emotions on desire to affiliate similarly reveals sadness as a 
significant and unique predictor, β = .26, p = .005, while none of the other emotions were 
predictive (all p’s > .27).  
Next, a repeated measures analysis examined the effect on buying for self-vs. buying for 
others. Results revealed a significant interaction effect F(1,178) = 8.87, p = .003, and this 
effect is consistent while controlling for the other emotions/arousal F(1,166) = 6.52, p = 
.01 (see Figure 7). Examining the simple main effects reveals that individuals in the sad 
condition were more likely to want to buy an item for / spend time with a close other (M 
= 4.73, SE = .16) as opposed to themselves (M = 4.14, SE = .15), p < .001, whereas those 
in the control condition, were equally likely to want to buy something for themselves (M 
= 4.51, SE = .16) compared to others (M = 4.42, SE = .17, p = .58). Further, a mediation 
analysis (Hayes 2012, Model 4, 5,000 Bootstraps) demonstrated that the effect of buying 
for others was mediated by desire to affiliate, β = -.42, SE = .15, [95% CI: -.76, -.14], and 
is this effect remained consistent controlling for emotions and arousal, β = -.46, SE = .17, 
[95% CI: -.82, -.16]. In addition, although there was no main effect on charity giving 
t(178) = -.1, ns, there was a significant indirect effect through desire to affiliate. 
Specifically, those in the sad condition showed a greater desire to affiliate and this 
subsequently led to greater donations, β = -.03, SE = .02, [95% CI: -.08, -.01]. 
Empathy. To rule out the effect of empathy, an ANOVA assessing the effect of movie 
condition on desire to affiliate, controlling for the four empathy factors was conducted. 
Consistent with the above results, sad movies resulted in a greater desire to affiliate than 
the control movies F(1,174) = 8.13, p = .005. Similarly, the same pattern of interaction is 
observed when we assess motivation to buy for oneself vs. buying for others while 
controlling for these four factors, F(1,174) = 8.98, p = .003, as do the mediation models, 
β = -.38, SE = .15, 95% CI: [-.69, -.13] and β = -.02, SE = .02, 90% CI: [-.056, -.002], for 
other-giving and charity, respectively. 
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Figure 7: Conditional effects on spending on self vs. spending on a friend (Study 3) 
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Discussion 
The results of study 3 provide further evidence to the instrumental function of sadness. 
Consumers exposed to the sad movies were more motivated to affiliate and subsequently 
were more likely to want to buy a gift and spend time with others compared to 
themselves. Further, this effect is driven by sadness and not by other negatively valenced 
emotions. However, whether this motivation to connect with others leads to greater 
enjoyment of sad media remains an open question. This idea is examined in the following 
study. In addition, the current study explores the alternative explanation of mood more 
systematically.  
 Study 4 
The goal of study 4 was to explore whether the effect of sadness on one’s desire to 
affiliate also led to greater enjoyment and subjective well-being. As noted, social 
relationships are an important factor in predicting well-being and thus emotions that 
increases this motivation should subsequently result in greater wellbeing (Hoffman et al., 
2014). Further, prior research has explored why individuals enjoy consuming sadness, but 
little attention has been given to the motivation for greater social connection.  
Method 
227 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 42 failed the attention 
checks leaving a total of 185 (Mage = 36.5, 45% female). Participants were assigned to 
either a sad or control condition. The same movies were used as in study 3.  
As noted, other research has suggested that the enjoyment of sadness may be the function 
of social comparison (Knobloch-Westerwick et al, 2012) and as such participants 
completed a measure of social comparison (e.g. I often compare myself with others with 
respect to what I have accomplished in life, 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree, α 
= .92; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). After watching the film clips, participants completed a 
manipulation check assessing the primary negative emotional states (sadness, anger, etc.). 
In order to assess and explore the alternative explanation of mood participants were asked 
about their mood utilizing the BMIS (Brief Mood Introspection Scale; Mayer & Gaschke, 
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1988, negative mood, 7 questions α = .87 and positive mood, 8 questions, α = .85)2. The 
positive and negative mood factors were negatively correlated r = -.32, p < .001.  Positive 
and negative items were aggregated to form a single mood measure. Positive items were 
reverse coded and thus higher scores indicate a more negative mood.  
Following, participants completed a series of measures that were counterbalanced. There 
were no significant effects of the counterbalancing (all p’s > .27). Specifically, 
participants completed the desire to affiliate scale (α = .89), the self versus other giving 
scale, and then to control the effect of catharsis and norm compatibility, a catharsis scale 
(e.g “I believe that it is useful to cry when life becomes stressful”, α = .95; adapted from 
Vingerhoets, 1997), and a norm compatibility scale (e.g. “My feelings were appropriate 
with regard to the clip” α = .91; Hofer & Wirth 2012).  
Finally, participants were asked about their eudemonic subjective wellbeing (Wirth, 
Hofer, & Schramm, 2012, see Appendix for items). The eudemonic subjective wellbeing 
scale consists of two second-order factors. The first, ‘deeper reflection’ corresponds with 
greater relatedness, personal growth, and an activation of one’s central values (9 
questions, α = .91). The second factor, ‘life evaluation’ reflects a feeling of greater 
purpose in life, self-acceptance and autonomy (6 questions, α = .91,). Participants were 
then asked about how much they enjoyed the film, basic demographics, and whether they 
had seen the clip before (Yes, No). Controlling for whether participants had seen the clip 
did not affect the results. 
Results 
Manipulation Check: A manipulation revealed that the three sadness movies did not 
differ in their level of sadness (p’s > .17), but all differed from the 3 control movies (all 
p’s <.001) and thus the movies were aggregated into their respective conditions. 
Assessing the difference between the aggregated sad condition (M = 5.48, SD = 1.74) and 
the aggregated control condition (M = 1.78, SD = 1.12) reveals a significant effect on 
                                                 
2
 One of the items traditionally in the scale was sadness, which was removed.  
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sadness, t(183) = 18.66 p < .001. There were no differences on any of the other emotions. 
There was a marginally significant effect on mood, such that those in the sad condition 
had a worse mood (M = 3.18, SD = .96) compared to those in the control condition (M = 
2.90, SD = .96), t(183) = 1.96, p = .051. The effect of condition on sadness remains 
controlling for negative mood, F(1,182) = 335.43, p < .001. See Table 13 for correlations. 
Primary analysis. Consistent with study 2 and study 3, participants in the sad condition 
showed a greater desire to affiliate (M = 4.31, SD = 3.83) compared to those in the 
control condition (M = 3.83, SD = 1.48) t(183) = 2.11, p = .036. Examining the unique 
effects of mood and sadness on desire to affiliate demonstrates that although sadness and 
mood were correlated r = .20, p = .006, sadness leads to a greater desire to affiliate, β = 
.24, p = .001, while mood had no effect β = -.10, p = .20. In addition, replicating the 
effects of study 3, a repeated measures analysis demonstrated a significant interaction 
effect, F(1,183) = 8.11, p = .005 (Figure 8). Exploring the simple main effects reveals 
that individuals in the sad condition were more likely to want to buy an item for / spend 
time with a close other (M = 5.21, SD = 1.24) as opposed to themselves (M = 4.33, SD = 
1.49), p < .001, whereas those in the control condition, were equally likely to want to buy 
something for themselves (M = 4.46, SD = 1.30) compared to others (M = 4.68, SD = 
1.46), p = .22). This effect remained when controlling for negative mood F(1,182) = 9.40, 
p = .003. Similarly, regressing sadness and negative mood on giving to others revealed 
sadness as a positive predictor, β = .31, p < .001, while negative mood was negatively 
predictive β = -.29, p < .0013. 
Next we assessed whether this desire to affiliate helped to explain why participants 
enjoyed the sad film. Although there was no difference in overall level of enjoyment 
between the sad and control clips, a mediation analysis (Hayes 2012, Model 4, 5,000 
 
                                                 
3
 Examining the effect of the positive and negative items independently reveals that the positive mood 
items corresponded with a greater desire to affiliate r = .27, p < .001 and greater giving to other r = .30, p < 
.001, while negative mood items did not predict either desire to affiliate r = -.05, p = .49 or other giving, r = 
-.07 p = .37. 
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Figure 8: Conditional effects on spending on self vs. spending on a friend (Study 4) 
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bootstraps) demonstrated an indirect effect of desire to affiliate on enjoyment, β = -.12, 
SE = .07, [95% CI: -.29 -.02] and this effect remained consistent controlling for catharsis, 
social comparison, and norm compatibility, β = -.08, SE = .05, [95% CI: -.21 -.01]. 
Further, sadness had no overall effect on enjoyment, r = .05, p = .48, but one’s mood did 
r = -.35 p < .001. The lack of main effect on enjoyment was ostensibly due to this 
separate effect of mood. That is, although watching a sad movie led to a greater 
motivation to affiliate and subsequent greater enjoyment, it also led to a more negative 
mood and subsequent less enjoyment. A mediation analysis (Hayes 2012, Model 4, 5,000 
Bootstraps) assessing both desire to affiliate and mood concurrently demonstrated that 
both had an effect, albeit in opposite directions, with desire to affiliate continuing to 
mediate β = -.08, SE = .05, [95% CI: -.23, -.01] as well as one’s mood, β = .15, SE = .08, 
[95% CI: .03, .35] 
Finally, we examined the effect on eudemonic well-being. The sad movie condition 
resulted in greater feeling of both deeper reflection (M = 4.60, SD = 1.20 vs. M = 3.86, 
SD = 1.24), t(183) = 4.11, p < .001 and life evaluation, (M = 3.84, SD = 1.20 vs. M = 
3.36, SD = 1.24), t(183) = 2.32, p = .02. Further, both deeper reflection β = -.07, SE = 
.05, [95% CI: -.21 -.01] and life evaluation, β = -.11, SE = .06, [95% CI: -.26 -.01] were 
mediated by one’s desire to affiliate. That is, the sad movie condition resulted in a greater 
desire to affiliate and this subsequently led to a greater eudaimonic wellbeing. Ultimately, 
it was this increase in eudaimonic well-being that leads to enjoyment. Assessing the 
mediating effect of affiliation on enjoyment via eudaimonia revealed a significant 
mediating effect β = .13, SE = .05, [95% CI: .05, .24] 
Of interest, a regression of both sadness and negative mood on eudaimonic wellbeing 
demonstrates that, they exhibited opposite effects on wellbeing. Specifically, sadness 
positively predicted (β = .46, p < .001, β = .34, p < .001), but negative mood negatively 
predicted (β = -.33, p <.001, β = -.41, p < .001) deeper reflection and life meaning, 
respectively. These effects remain when assessed independently via bivariate 
correlations, with sadness positively predicting (r = .39, p < .001 and (r = .25, p < .001) 
and negative mood negatively predicting (r = -.24, p = .001 and (r = .34, p < .001). That 
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is, although sadness is viewed as a negatively valanced emotion, it predicted positive 
well-being while negative mood in general was negatively predictive.  
Discussion 
The results of study 4 support and extend the previous results. Specifically, after 
watching a sad movie participants had a greater desire to affiliate and this subsequently 
led to greater enjoyment of the media and greater subjective well-being. Further, the 
results help to elucidate the differing nature of sadness versus negative mood in general. 
While negative mood leads to an overall negative outlook, in terms of both enjoyment 
and well-being, sadness has the opposite effect.  
  Study 5 
Study 5 sought to explore the effect of sadness on affiliation in a more ecologically valid 
setting and to explore actual behavior. Specifically, participants thus far had only 
watched a short clip and dependent measures were limited to self-report. Thus, in the 
current study, participants were recruited to a movie theatre, watched a full twenty-two 
minute television episode, and were then provided an opportunity to give chocolate to 
others or to receive chocolate for themselves.  
Method 
1704 participants (35% female, Mage = 19.49) were recruited to watch a film at the 
campus’ movie theatre. The study took place over three days and three different sessions 
were run each day. A maximum of 30 participants were recruited per session and the 
number of participants per session ranged from 13 to 29. Participants were assigned to 
either a sad or control condition. To control for systematic differences in the shows, 
episodes of the same shows were used. Specifically, two episodes of Fresh Prince of Bel-
air and two episodes of Futurama were used.  
                                                 
4
 4 Participants skipped the PANAS questions and 1 participant skipped the subjective well-being 
questions 
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Participants began by watching an episode and following, participants completed an 
emotion manipulation check. Afterwards, participants completed a chocolate assortment 
task (Rucker, Dubiois, & Galinsky, 2010). Specifically, participants were told that they 
would be allowed to take twenty chocolates but to indicate how many they wanted for 
themselves and how many they wanted for other people. Participants were also told that 
they did not have to take all twenty chocolates. Afterwards, gift bags filled with 
chocolates were given to reflect their choices and then participants were instructed to 
complete a few additional questions which included the flourishing scale (Diener et al., 
2009), a measure of subjective wellbeing (e.g. “I lead a purposeful and meaningful life”  
1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree, 8 questions α = .89), and the PANAS 
(Watson et al., 1988) which included 10 items for positive affect (α = .90) and 10 items 
for negative affect (α = .85). Lastly, a few control questions assessing whether 
participants had seen the episode before, whether they had been given chocolates prior, 
and whether they had come with a friend. None of these control variables affected the 
results, nor did controlling for the number of participants per session.  
Results  
Manipulation Check. Examining the effect of condition on level of sadness revealed a 
strong and significant effect with the sad condition eliciting more sadness (M = 5.46, SD 
= 1.34) compared to the control condition (M = 2.13, SD = 1.50), t(168) = 15.28, p < 
.001. There was a marginal effect of show type F(1,166) = 3.12, p = .08, however the 
difference was only a matter of degree and both sad shows were significantly different 
from their control condition (Fresh Prince M = 5.69, SD = 1.16 vs. M = 1.94, SD = 1.18, 
t(74) = 13.73, p < .001 and Futurama: M = 5.21, SD = 1.49 vs. M = 2.24, SD = 1.66, 
t(92) = 8.93, p < .001). Lastly, there were strong correlations between sadness and the 
other emotions, (see table 14). However, when controlling for sadness, there was no 
effect of condition (all p’s > .1), whereas even controlling for the other emotions, there 
was still a strong effect of condition on sadness F(1,155) = 36.74, p < .001.  
Primary Analysis. A repeated measures analysis was computed between condition on 
number of chocolates given and number of chocolates received. Results indicated a 
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significant interaction F(1,168) = 14.31, p < .001 (See Figure 9). Examining the 
interaction reveals that participants in the sad condition took fewer chocolates for 
themselves (M = 4.07, SD = 3.77) compared to those in the control condition (M = 6.91, 
SD =5.43), p < .001, while giving more chocolates in the sad condition (M = 15.54, SD = 
3.81) compared to the control condition (M = 12.97, SD = 5.42), p = .001. There was no 
show type by condition interaction, F(1,166) = .02, p = .90 and controlling for date and 
time did not affect the results F(1,166) = 7.42, p = .007. A regression assessing the 
effects of all the emotions on giving chocolate reveals sadness as the only significant 
predictor, (β = .29, p =.01), as well as the only significant negative predictor for giving to 
self (β = -.38, p = .001). Next, the effect of giving to others on positive and negative 
affect was assessed.  
A mediation analysis (Hayes 2012, Model 4, 5,000 Bootstraps) demonstrated an indirect 
effect of condition (1 = Sad, 2 = Control) on positive affect, through giving to others, β = 
-.10, SE = .05, 95% CI: [-.22, -.02], and no effect on negative affect β = -.02, SE = .02, 
95% CI: [-.08, .02]. That is, despite sadness predicting greater giving of chocolates, as a 
result of giving more, they expressed greater positive affect and no differences in 
negative affect. 
Lastly, we examined the indirect effect of condition through giving to others on 
subjective well-being. A mediation analysis (Hayes 2012, Model 4, 5,000 Bootstraps) 
was executed. Consistent with study 4, there was an indirect effect of condition on 
subjective well-being (β = -.07, SE = .04, 95% CI: [-.19, -.01]), such that participants in 
the sad condition gave more and subsequently reported greater subjective well-being,  
Discussion  
The results of study 5 confirm and extend the previous findings in a more ecologically 
valid setting using real behavior. After watching a sad episode in a movie theatre, 
participants gave more / took less chocolates. Subsequently, as a result of giving more, 
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Figure 9: Conditional effects on the number of chocolates given to self and others. 
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these participants reported greater subjective well-being. Further, despite sadness leading 
to greater giving; after giving more, participants expressed greater positive affect and no 
differences in negative affect. Thus, these results provide behavioral evidence that this 
desire to affiliate and subsequent giving to others, regulated participants’ level of sadness.   
  General Discussion 
Across five experiments, the current research explores the effect of sadness on one’s 
desire to affiliate. This desire to affiliate results in individuals being more prosocial, 
opting to spend more time and gifts on others. This desire results in greater enjoyment of 
sad media and also a subsequent greater feeling of subjective wellbeing. Further, this 
effect is not explained by general mood maintenance as general negative mood had the 
opposite effect. The current research provides a number of notable contributions.  
First, this research provides one of the first systematic investigations on the effects of 
consuming sadness and demonstrates that it can result in a desire to affiliate with others. 
Subsequently, consumers have a greater desire to engage in behaviors that promote this 
goal. This contrasts previous work on sadness, which has argued that sadness results in 
greater desire for hedonic compensatory consumption, such as an increase of sweet/fatty 
foods (Garg, Wansink, & Inman, 2007; Garg & Lerner, 2013; Cryder, Lerner, Gross & 
Dahl, 2008). I address the nuance between these findings in the following section. 
Second, this research builds on general mood and negative affect research and examines 
the unique consequences of sadness. Although there is a considerable amount of research 
that has explored the effect of general emotional valence on consumption (e.g. Isen 
2001), there is limited work on specific emotional states. The current research provides 
evidence that a focus on valence or even valence and arousal (e.g. Di Muro & Murray, 
2012; Lerner & Keltner 2001), may not be sufficient. Rather, specific emotional states 
provide unique and even contrasting motivational and behavioural predictions. 
Third, the current research examines the underlying reasons for why consumers enjoy 
sadness. Specifically, sadness provides consumers with a motivation to affiliate and this 
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increased motivation leads to greater enjoyment. Specifically, sadness provides a sense of 
utility, in the form of a greater feeling of meaning, reflection, and subjective well-being. 
Future research and limitations 
Although the current research found consistent results across a variety of different 
stimuli, the manipulations all utilized videos to elicit sadness. Whether sadness induced 
by a film is different from sadness induced by other media or by life-events remains an 
open question. However, in one study, participants were asked to imagine the loss of a 
loved one to cancer and then were asked to what extent they wanted to engage in social 
or work-related activities (Gray, Ishii, & Ambady, 2011, experiment 3). Consistent with 
the results presented here, imagining this situation resulted in greater desire for social 
activities.  
Similarly, the sad movie clips may have systematically motivated a desire to affiliate 
through their content.  Although the effects were found across a number of different clips 
they tended to all deal with social loss, often (but not exclusively) through the death of a 
loved one. It is possible that social loss primed social connection or that the motivation to 
affiliate was driven by mortality salience. Whether activating sadness through music or 
through recalling a sad situation would lead to a greater desire to affiliate remains an 
open question. 
One may wonder why these results seemingly juxtapose with the stereotype of the sad 
recluse. This inconsistency is informed by the fact that individuals, particularly men, 
generally hide their sadness, because it is associated with powerlessness, vulnerability, or 
weakness (Timmins, Fischer, & Manstead,1998) and a focus on happiness in Western 
cultures results on positive emotions being generally desirable, while negative emotions 
being undesirable (Eid & Diener, 2001). Research on the normative acceptance of 
sadness has demonstrated that individuals are generally anxious about discussing sad 
emotions (Kilmartin, 2005; Zeman & Garber 1996), and stigma towards depression 
remains an ongoing concern (Latalova, Kamaradova, & Prasko, 2014). Thus, sadness 
motivates one to connect with others, while at the same time cultural norms lead people 
to withdraw. This may help to explain why depression and related mental health 
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problems remain a serious issue, with suicide rates in the United States, which is 
predicted by a lack of social support (Kleimen & Liu, 2013) increasing nearly 30 percent 
over the last twenty years (Center for Disease Control, 2016).  
Similarly, A growing literature on the effect of social media and depression has 
demonstrated that individuals who use social media more frequently tend to have greater 
rates of depression (Primack et al., 2017; van den Eijnden et al., 2008). Although there 
may be differences between normal sadness and depression, the typical link speculated in 
these correlational studies is that greater social media use leads to depression. However, 
the results from this study suggest the opposite causal pattern, whereby those who are 
more sad may seek out greater social connection via social media.  
In addition, the results presented here are at odds with some other findings in the 
literature. For example, recent research by Dunn and Hoegg (2014) examined the effect 
of fear on brand emotional attachment. In one study (experiment 4), they examined 
sadness as a control and did not find an effect. However, a re-analysis of their data (Dunn 
2016, personal communication), reveals that after watching the movies, there were 
correlations between sadness and emotional attachment, affiliation and brand connection, 
(r = .19, p = .08, r = .24, p = .02 and r = .26, p = .01, respectively). The lack of main 
effect may have been due to a conflation of emotions across the conditions and a 
relatively low mean sadness rating for the particular movie (M = 2.90, SD = .96, out of 
5). Ultimately, these results coupled with findings of the current paper suggest that 
sadness may help create greater attachment towards brands.  
Further, other research examining sadness and consumption has demonstrated that 
sadness can lead to ‘retail therapy’ in that consumers are more willing to pay for items in 
order to enhance their self (Cryder, Lerner, Gross & Dahl, 2008). However, this research 
did not examine consumer motivation on buying for others and only found the effect 
when participants were manipulated to focus on the self. Relatedly, recent research (Garg 
& Lerner, 2013) demonstrated that sadness led to greater food consumption, via greater 
helplessness. When participants were induced with a greater sense of control, the effect 
of sadness on consumption was attenuated. In relation to the current paper, these findings 
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suggest that individual and contextual differences that affect whether an individual 
focuses on the self and/or has the opportunity to seek out help from others may moderate 
the effect of sadness on one’s desire to affiliate. 
Although the study 2 post-test did not find a similar link between sadness and perceived 
social support as study 2, this may have been due to the moderating factors of  attachment 
styles and socioeconomic status between the two samples. Specifically, individuals with 
lower socioeconomic status tend to show less secure attachment styles than those with 
higher socioeconomic status (Bakermans-Kranenburg, Van IJzendoorn, & Kroonenberg, 
2004). The secure attachment style is characterized by parents who are quicker to respond 
to their children’s cries and thus sadness should be more highly associated with social 
connection for these individuals. Given that study 2 examined university students who 
typically are of higher socioeconomic status, while the post-test examined participants via 
Mechanical Turk, the effect of sadness on the feeling of greater social support may be 
qualified by secure attachment styles. Another possibility is that the student participants 
watched their respective movie clips in the presences of others, whereas the online 
participants watched their clips alone.  Thus, the shared experience of the sadness may 
have lead the participants to feel greater levels of support. 
Finally, while the current research provides evidence that sadness results in a desire to 
connect with others, it raises the question of what motivates consumers to seek out sad 
media in the first place. One possibility is that the consumers with a greater need to 
belong or who are currently feeling lonely seek out sadness in an attempt to increase their 
motivation to connect with others. Evidence from the research on catharsis supports this 
view, with lay theories suggesting that individuals seek out crying to ease the 
psychological distress (Cornelius 1986; Bylsma, Vingerhoets, & Rottenberg 2008), while 
participants from study 1 suggested that they seek out sadness when experiencing social 
loss. Nevertheless, understanding what motivates consumers to seek out sadness provides 
an interesting avenue for future research.  
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Conclusion 
As the opening quote by Freud illustrates, for many of us, our primary goal is to be 
“happy.”  Subsequently, we tend to run from the negative feelings of sadness and 
similarly encourage others to not be sad. However, sadness need not be appraised as 
unpleasant. Instead, there may be a utility to sadness, motivating us to forge stronger 
social connections with others.   
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Table 8: Means and SD of video emotion condition on reported emotions 
 
 Reported Emotion 
 
Anger Disgust Fear Joy Sad 
Condition M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Sad 5.40 1.13 3.44 1.64 4.27 1.66 1.79 1.13 5.38 1.11 
Anger 5.36 1.41 3.2 1.62 3.84 1.67 1.94 1.28 3.40 1.42 
Fear 4.56 1.58 4.34 1.75 6.22 1.04 2.00 1.26 3.60 1.66 
Disgust 5.86 1.36 5.96 1.26 4.78 1.81 3.62 1.82 3.22 1.62 
Joy 1.80 1.20 1.74 1.10 1.4 0.78 3.73 1.71 1.64 0.96 
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Table 9: Correlation table between emotions, study 2 
  
 Sad Angry Fear Disgust Joy Shame Relaxed Anxious Surprised Excited Lonely Bored Upset Nervous 
Sad 1              
Angry .650** 1             
Fear .503** .539** 1            
Disgust .202** .530** .345** 1           
Joy -.329** -.261** -.352** -.312** 1          
Shame .160* .280** 0.04 .259** .196** 1         
Relaxed -.259** -.291** -.482** -.346** .491** -0.01 1        
Anxious .211** .191** .484** .233** -.178** -0.03 -.441** 1       
Surprised -.222** -0.03 0.00 0.12 .295** .203** 0.02 .169** 1           
Excited -.218** -.215** -0.06 -.178** .553** 0.03 .188** 0.07 .315** 1         
Lonely .249** .131* .212** 0.12 0.08 .250** -0.07 .161* .202** .151* 1       
Bored 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.12 -.161* .180** 1     
Upset .649** .613** .466** .383** -.275** .277** -.385** .288** 0.07 -.176** .319** .137* 1   
Nervous .323** .259** .630** .228** -.245** 0.11 -.438** .591** .153* 0.10 .343** 0.03 .415** 1 
137 
 
 
Table 10: Correlations and regression weights of the five focal emotions 
 
Desire to Affiliate 
Perceived Social 
Support Social Connectedness 
 
r β r β r β 
Sad .19** .30** .15* 0.19 .03 0.1 
Angry .05 -.24* .05 -.24 -.01 -.10 
Fear .16* .13 .15* .18 .06 .08 
Disgust .08 .13 -.03 .01 .01 .04 
Joy -.06 .07 -.06 -.01 .02 .07 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 11: Reported emotions on movie pretest. 
 Reported Emotion 
 Sad Anger Fear Disgust 
Clip M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Changing Batteries 5.27 1.42 1.73 .91 2.45 1.7 1.82 1.25 
Up 5.58 .79 1.17 .39 1.50 1.45 1.08 .29 
Click 5.00 1.34 1.82 1.08 2.27 1.59 2.00 1.33 
Saving Private Ryan 4.15 1.95 1.62 1.19 1.15 .38 1 0 
Lion King* 6.00 1.08 4.85 1.57 2.69 1.89 3.92 2.06 
Good Will Hunting* 5.18 1.53 3.83 1.40 2.33 1.56 3.00 1.71 
*Note: Although Lion King and Good Will Hunting elicited more sadness, the 
differences were not statistically significant. However, they did show statistically higher 
levels of anger, fear, and disgust, and were thus not used.  
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Table 12: Items and factor loading for buying for self and other (varimax rotation). 
Item Factor 1 (Other) Factor 2 (Self) 
Eat a meal by myself .007 .826 
Play a game by myself .162 .760 
Do something nice for myself .265 .830 
Buy a gift for myself .382 .693 
Play a game with a close friend .769 .263 
Buy a gift for a close friend .838 .125 
Do something nice for a close friend .873 .212 
Eat a meal with a close friend .878 .134 
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Table 13: Correlations between emotions and mood (study 4) 
 
Sad Angry Fear Disgust Mood* 
Sad 1 
    
Angry .20** 1 
   
Fear .24** .45** 1 
  
Disgust .04 .56** .30** 1 
 
Mood .20** .11 .27** .14 1 
*Note:  Mood reflects aggregate mean from the BMIS (Brief Mood Introspection Scale) 
Higher values reflect greater negative mood. For list of items see Appendix. 
** p < .01  
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Table 14: Correlations between emotions and arousal states (study 5) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. 1 
            
2. .778** 1 
           
3. .436** .505** 1 
          
4. .602** .726** .520** 1 
         
5. -.635** -.542** -.264** -.491** 1 
        
6. .265** .382** .367** .379** -.094 1 
       
7. -.597** -.604** -.342** -.544** .563** -.243** 1 
      
8. .352** .418** .493** .319** -.250** .419** -.394** 1 
     
9. -.074 -.120 -.090 -.164* .224** .066 .109 .125 1 
    
10 
 
-.142 -.075 .080 -.013 .248** .143 .145 .077 .300** 1 
   
11. -.155* -.120 -.011 -.133 .073 .137 .195* .224** .194* -.088 1 
  
12. -.294** -.201** -.031 -.232** .459** .067 .306** -.024 .239** .582** -.245** 1 
 
13. .023 .048 .176* .035 -.055 .258** -.065 .343** .140 -.057 .648** -.219** 1 
 
Note: 1 = Sad, 2 = Angry, 3 = Fear, 4 = Disgust. 5 = Joy. 6 = Shame, 7 = Relaxed, 8 = Anxious, 9 = Surprised, 10 = Active, 11 = Drowsy, 12 = Lively, 13 = 
Exhausted 
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5 Final Thoughts and Directions for Future Research 
 
The impact of affective states has long been known to play an important role in consumer 
perception, attitudes, and behaviour (Schwarz 2000; Zajonc 1980). While much of this 
work has focused on mood valence in general (Gardner 1985; Andrade 2005; Ludwig et 
al., 2013; Arnold & Reynolds 2009; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Schwarz & Clore 2003; 
Cohen, Pham, & Andrade 2008), a growing body of research has begun to unpack the 
differences between discrete emotional states, such as excitement and peacefulness (Kim, 
Park, & Schwarz, 2010), anger and sadness (Garg, Inman, and Mittal 2005) or the 
moderating impact of arousal (Di Muro & Murray 2012).  
Further, the work on mood regulation has similarly focused on maintaining positive 
moods and alleviating or mitigating negative ones, but a nuanced understanding of the 
underlying motivations involved in specific and discrete emotional states remains an 
important and ongoing area of research. Indeed, as Di Muro & Murray (2012) 
demonstrate, although consumers seek to regulate their mood, differences in arousal 
systematically affect the ways in which they do so. In line with these and related ideas, 
this dissertation sought to better understand the roles of specific emotional states and the 
subsequent regulatory processes that consumers may engage in. 
Essay 1, Embodied cognition and social consumption: Self-regulating temperature 
through social products and behaviors, provides an introductory framework to the idea 
that consumers seek to regulate emotions. Drawing on the literature demonstrating an 
association between loneliness and cold, the research demonstrated that individuals can 
reduce this perceived lack of interpersonal warmth by substituting it with physical 
warmth. In contrast to previous work which has argued that these manipulations activate 
concepts and increase the accessibility of related ideas, essay 1 argued that individuals 
are motivated to ameliorate emotional and physical discrepancies via consumptive 
behaviour.  
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Essay 2, The Warmth of our Regrets: Managing Regret Through Physiological 
Regulation Via Consumptive Behavior built on these ideas by exploring the effect of self-
conscious emotions such as shame, embarrassment, guilt, and remorse that arise from 
experiencing action regret. Demonstrating that experiencing these self-conscious 
emotions leads to a greater perception of warmth, consumers seek to ameliorate this 
change via interaction with objects that are perceived to be physically opposite in 
temperature. 
Lastly, in essay 3, The Utility of Sadness: Exploring the Consequences of Sad 
Consumption, I examine the consequences underlying the paradoxical phenomenon of 
sad consumption and the regulatory mechanisms consumers take as a result. I 
demonstrate that sadness, but not negative mood in general, results in a motivation to 
connect with others. Subsequently, consumers are more likely to spend time and money 
on other individuals. Further, this motivation to connect with others leads to the 
enjoyment of sad media and a greater sense of subjective well-being.  
Taken together, the three essays advance consumer behavior research in several ways. 
First, I demonstrate novel effects to various negative emotional states, whether they be 
loneliness (essay 1), shame, guilt, embarrassment and remorse (essay 2), or sadness 
(essay 3). As these studies show, differing discrete emotional states result in varying 
regulatory outcomes that cannot be explained by other emotions or negative mood alone. 
Further, in essay 1 and essay 2, I explore an embodied regulatory mechanism, in which 
emotional and physical discrepancies in temperature lead to compensatory consumption 
to ameliorate this discrepancy. In line with recent research which has argued that 
attachment and social connection is scaffolded from basic thermoregulation processes 
(Ijzerman et al., 2013) and that seeking warmth is explained by a goal-systems approach 
(Zhang & Risen, 2014), I demonstrated that consumers are motivated to offset 
emotional/physical discrepancies with related physical/emotional consumption.  
Although essay 3 does not examine this effect from an embodied perspective, the results 
are consistent and provide an interesting parallel. For example, self-conscious emotions, 
which essay 2 demonstrated are associated with a feeling of warmth, result in a 
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motivation to withdraw from social situations (Tangney et al., 1996), an experience that 
is associated with a desire for cold. Sadness, on the other hand, has been shown to be 
associated with cold (Nummenmaa, Glerean, Hari, & Hietanen, 2013), was found to be 
associated with a desire to connect with others, a behavior associated with warmth.  
Lastly, this research provides further evidence that consumers engage in emotional 
compensatory consumption. While previous research has demonstrated a number of ways 
in which consumers may compensate for specific cognitive discrepancies, this research 
focuses on the regulation of emotional discrepancies. Although a number of findings 
examining emotion regulation are consistent with these ideas, they do not necessarily 
study it from this theoretical perspective. Subsequently, I suggest a number of paths for 
future exploration. 
First, as noted, a regulatory perspective suggests that individuals seek to maintain 
positive affect and mitigate negative affect, with many previous findings consistent with 
this view (Kim, Park, & Schwarz, 2010; Garg, Inman, and Mittal 2005). Consistent with 
these ideas, consider the findings of Kim and colleagues (2010) who demonstrated a 
congruency effect, whereby those who were excited preferred an adventurous vacation 
appeal, while those who felt more peaceful preferred a more serene vacation appeal. 
However, individuals also have an optimal arousal point that leads people to seek out 
more arousing activities when too low and more relaxing activities when too high. The 
manipulation by Kim et al (2010) only increased levels of excitement and peaceful to 
around the midpoint (e.g. 2.98 and 3.28 out of 5, respectively): thus, whether consumers 
would seek out affect-incongruent experiences at extreme levels of excitement and/or 
peacefulness remains an open question5.  
Secondly, the nature of emotion regulation may lead to differing effects over time for 
positive and negative emotions. Specifically, a key consequence of goal activation is that 
                                                 
5
 Although a secondary explanation is that arousal and valence are not necessarily independent and that 
levels that are too high or too low are aversive. While some researchers have argued that they are truly 
independent (e.g. Russell & Barrett 1999; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993), others have argued 
that they may interact (e.g. Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). Nevertheless, this provides an 
additional avenue of future exploration. 
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these effects have enduring behavioral effects that increase over time until they are 
satiated (Sela & Shiv 2009; Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, and Aarts 2007). Consequently, 
consumers in a negative emotional state should tend to be motivated to mitigate that state, 
and this motivation should increase over time. Conversely, the effect on maintaining 
positive affect is more ambiguous. Self-consistent manipulations correspond with 
semantic activation and tend to be fleeting (Sela and Shiv 2009; Forster, Liberman, and 
Friedman, 2007). Thus, although research has demonstrated that individuals manipulated 
to be in more positive moods show mood-congruent attitudes and behaviors, whether 
these effects exhibit the same temporal pattern as negative emotions is an interesting 
avenue for research. 
Third, individual differences in affect intensity (Larsen & Diener & Cropanzano, 1987), 
attention to emotion, clarity of feelings, and mood regulation (e.g. Trait Meta-Mood 
Scale, Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey & Palfair, 1995; Gohm 2003), faith in intuition 
(Epstein, Pacini, Denes, Raj, & Heier, 1996), or other emotionally related individual 
difference variables likely played a moderating role in each of the above chapters. For 
example, research by Larsen and colleagues suggests that consumers differ in their 
propensity to interpret events as having greater personal meaning and also differ in the 
extent to which they focus and generalize their emotional states. Similarly, Gohm (2003), 
showed that individual differences resulted in differences in risk judgments, reactivity to 
emotional stimuli, and mood regulation. Presumably, differences in these cognitions also 
played a role in the extent to which different consumers felt shame, sadness, or social 
warmth and the extent to which they sought out related compensatory consumption.  
Fourth, the emphasis on self-reported emotions, both here and in most marketing 
research, presents a unique set of problems. Questions surrounding the nature of emotions 
have been asked throughout recorded history, and whether emotions exist as natural 
kinds, that is, whether sadness, anger, fear, etc., are independent of our perception and 
produce distinctive internal states and feelings that are universal across all individuals, 
still remains a highly debated topic (see Barrett 2006 for a review). If emotions are not 
discrete states, but rather, are emergent phenomena arising from more base physiological 
states (e.g. affect, arousal, temperature), then how do they arise, and why might they 
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differ between individuals? Why might one consumer respond to a product being sold-out 
with sadness, while another respond with anger? Interestingly, the results reported in 
essay 3 suggest that we need not always appraise negatively-valence emotions as 
unwanted. Further examining the ways in which consumers come to appraise these 
emotional states provide a unique avenue for exploring and understanding emotions and 
their subsequent effects on consumer judgment and behavior. 
Lastly, recent research on compensatory consumption has identified a number of different 
strategies that consumers utilize to regulate their psychological discrepancies; direct 
resolution, symbolic self-completion, dissociation, escapism, and fluid compensation 
(Mandel et al., 2015). However, these authors note that there is little known on when and 
why consumers opt for a particular strategy. However, they do note that when consumers 
are given an opportunity for direct resolution, they are more likely to use a direct 
resolution rather than symbolic or fluid compensation (e.g. Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, and 
Aronson 1997). Thus, the preference for a coupon (essay 1) or a cold drink (essay 2) may 
reflect a restricted forced choice experience limited to the experimental condition. 
Assessing these effects in a more ecologically valid situation where consumers have other 
choices remains an important next step. Indeed, had participants only had the option to 
buy for themselves after experiencing sadness (essay 3), they likely would have been 
more willing to do so (e.g. Cryder, Lerner, Gross & Dahl, 2008). 
In sum, drawing from a self-regulatory view of emotions, specific emotional states direct 
consumer judgment and behavior in unique but predictable ways. Specifically, consumers 
tend to seek compensatory consumption in service of regulating their emotional states. 
This consumption can take the form of embodied regulation via temperature or regulation 
in which emotions motivate specific instrumental behaviors such as a desire to connect 
with others. Much of consumption is based on consumers seeking positive and managing 
negative states. Subsequently, the current dissertation provides greater understanding and 
marketing knowledge of the underlying processes that enable consumers to do so 
effectively.   
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6 Appendices 
 Methodological Appendix Chapter 2 
6.1.1 Experiment 2 Robot Stimuli 
 
 
The inventors and engineers working with the IRT-4X is looking to you for help. 
While the prototype has been developed, they are looking for ways to increase the 
functionality of the robot-maid. Thus, we would like to ask your help in determining 
how YOU would like to utilize this robot in your home. In the next page, please 
indicate as many features/functions that you would like the IRT-4X to perform. There 
is no minimum or maximum that is required for your answer. 
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6.1.2 Experiment 3 Groupon Stimuli (Two person) 
Groupon has released a new movie package deal in your local theater. Please evaluate 
the desirability of the deal. The deal includes $30 for two movie tickets, two small 
popcorns, and two small drinks with reserved VIP Seating. 
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6.1.3 Experiment 3 Groupon Stimuli (One person) 
Groupon has released a new movie package deal in your local theater. Please evaluate 
the desirability of the deal. The deal includes one movie ticket, one small popcorn, and 
one small drink with reserved VIP Seating. 
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 Methodological Appendix Chapter 3 
6.2.1 Regret Recall Task 
Action Regret 
Recall an experience where you experienced a lot of regret as a result of your own 
actions/decisions. Write your story in the textbox below. Please be descriptive and detailed 
as possible.  
 
Inaction Regret 
Recall an experience where you experienced a lot of regret as a result of failing to act (e.g. 
missed opportunities). Write your story in the textbox below. Please be descriptive and 
detailed as possible.  
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6.2.2 Tea Manipulation 
Teavana (a Tea Company) is considering developing an Iced (Hot) Chai Mate Tea. This 
delicious tea forms a blend that is bold in flavor and rich in heritage. Ginger, cinnamon, 
cloves, nutmeg, combined with leaves and twigs of the yerba mate plant (mate teas give 
energy as coffee without the jitters) harmoniously balance with sweet notes of papaya and 
star anise. Spicy and rich, this sweet Ayurvedic blend contains a wealth of flavor. 
 
Once you have read the scenario, you may move on to the next page. 
 
 
A recent focus group research showed that this tea is indeed best served Cold (Warm).  
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6.2.3 Verap Pharmaceutical Manipulation 
Verap Pharmaceuticals is a pharmaceutical drug company that is looking for FDA approval 
on their first ever drug called the Vpam. Vpam is a treatment of agitation associated with 
schizophrenia or bipolar patients. More than 3.5 million adults suffer from this disorder in 
the United States, with 90% of those suffering from agitation. The company has recently 
created compounds which reduces patients’ level of agitation. The FDA is set to release 
their decision tomorrow and you are considering investing $500 in the stock. Currently, the 
stock price is at $2.50 (which means you can purchase 200 shares of the company). One 
analyst expects Vpam to be rejected by the FDA and has a price target of $1.25. Another 
analyst expects Vpam to be approved by the FDA and has a price target of $3.75.  
 
Please consider this situation as if it was a real-life situation. If you had $500 to invest in a 
stock, will you invest in this stock?        
Yes 
No 
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6.2.4 Cruise Manipulation (Cold) 
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6.2.5 Cruise Manipulation (Hot) 
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 Methodological Appendix Chapter 4 
6.3.1 Movie Stimuli Study 2 
Sadness 
1) Dangerous Minds 
2) City of Angels 
Joy 
1) The Dinner Game 
2) The Visitors 
Anger 
1) Schindler's list  
2) Sleepers  
Fear 
1) Blair Witch Project 
2) The Shining 
Disgust 
1) Trainspotting  
2) Seven  
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6.3.2 Desire to Affiliate Scale 
Right now, how much would you like to: 
1) Talk on the phone with a friend 
2) Spend time with a close friend 
3) Hang out with friends 
4) Write an email to a close other 
5) Make plans with a friend or significant other 
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6.3.3 Perceived Social Support Scale 
1. There is a special person who is around when I am in need  
2. There is a special person with whom I can share my joys and sorrows.  
3. My family really tries to help me.  
4. I get the emotional help and support I need from my family.  
5. I have a special person who is a real source of comfort to me.  
6. My friends really try to help me.  
7. I can count on my friends when things go wrong.  
8. I can talk about my problems with my family.  
9. I have friends with whom I can share my joys and sorrows.  
10. There is a special person in my life who cares about my feelings.  
11. My family is willing to help me make decisions.  
12. I can talk about my problems with my friends.  
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6.3.4 Social Connectedness Scale 
1. I feel disconnected from the world around me.  
2. Even around people I know, I don’t feel that I really belong.  
3. I feel so distant from people.  
4. I have no sense of togetherness with my peers.  
5. I don’t feel related to anyone.  
6. I catch myself losing all sense of connectedness with society.  
7. Even among my friends, there is no sense of brother/sisterhood.  
8. I don’t feel that I participate with anyone or any group. 
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6.3.5 Movies and YouTube Links 
Sad  
Up - https://youtu.be/F2bk_9T482g  
Changing batteries - https://youtu.be/O_yVo3YOfqQ 
Click - https://youtu.be/2_MIrzUc6-g 
 
Control videos  
Antarctica - https://youtu.be/DbKNlFcg02c 
Iron man - https://youtu.be/7phiJ-vxr0A 
Despicable Me - https://youtu.be/KsIcXZOZnfg 
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6.3.6 Eudaimonia Items 
 
1. I have a good feeling because the film has shown me how content I can be with my 
own life  
2. I feel good because now that I have seen this film I recognize my life as fulfilled 
and meaningful  
3. I feel good because this film has helped me to accept myself and my life  
4. I feel good because now that I have seen this film I feel that I am in charge of my 
own life   
5. The film leaves me in a good mood because I became aware of the fact that I am in 
charge of my own life  
6. It is good to recognize that my life is not in the hand of others 
7. I have a good feeling because the emotions that I felt during the film challenged me 
in a positive way 
8. It felt good to expose myself to the theme of the film  
9. I have a good feeling because the film has made me reflect on myself and my life. 
10. It felt good to be captivated by the events around the Protagonist during the film  
11. It felt good and right to feel empathy for the protagonist  
12. It felt good to feel compassion for the Protagonist during the film  
13. Precisely because the film was so distressing I had the feeling that the film 
delivered central values of life in an authentic way 
14. Altogether, I feel good because the Protagonist acted in a responsible way  
15. It makes me feel good to see that the Protagonist deals with his/her life’s trials and 
difficulties in an exemplary manner  
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6.3.7  Brief Mood Introspection Scale Items 
 
Lively  
Drowsy  
Happy  
Grouchy  
Sad  
Peppy  
Tired  
Nervous  
Caring  
Calm  
Content  
Loving  
Gloomy  
Fed up  
Jittery 
Active  
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6.3.8 Flourishing Scale, Subjective Wellbeing 
I lead a purposeful and meaningful life  
My social relationships are supportive and rewarding  
I am engaged and interested in my daily activities  
I actively contribute to the happiness and well-being of others  
I am competent and capable in the activities that are important to me  
I am a good person and live a good life  
I am optimistic about my future  
People respect me 
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